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In Search of York: Man, Myth & Legend

By Taylor V. Beattie
with Ronald Bowman

What you did was the greatest thing ever accomplished by any soldier of any of the armies of Europe.[1]

Marshal Ferdinand Foch, awarding the *Croix de Guerre* with palm to Sgt. Alvin C. York
24 April 1919

The men of the 2ᵈ Battalion, 328ᵗʰ Infantry Regiment, 82ᵈ Division, had spent a cold, wet, and miserable October day in a drainage ditch along the Varennes-Fléville road, a few kilometers shy of Fléville. With some trepidation they watched as a sister unit to the west struggled to take the heights of Hill 223 overlooking the town of Châtel-Chéhéry at the edge of the Argonne forest in northeastern France. All in all it could have been worse; they were resting now, and that beat the hell out of walking. Tired, scratchy eyes stared as the violent drama unfolded before them. The scene was reminiscent of a bad summer thunderstorm back home, at once spectacular and frightening. Flashes of light flickered across a cloud-darkened hill, silhouetting the tin hats of American soldiers scrambling up and about the slope with bayonets fixed. A rib-vibrating "caa-rump" of detonation followed these flashes of light. As in a thunderstorm, the closer the storm, the shorter the time from flash to bang. Small arms fire punctuated the damp air. The Germans were putting up a good fight, but the men of the 82ᵈ (All-American) Division were giving it back and more.

The American First Army was on the offensive in the Meuse-Argonne, a critical piece of the final Allied drive of the war directed by the French commander, Marshal Ferdinand Foch. This was largest land offensive to date in this war, and the men of the 82ᵈ Division were about to make some history.

Night fell, but the flashes of light from the small arms fire persisted. Eventually word filtered down the drainage ditch to prepare to move up the hill, now in American hands. In the distance somewhere beyond the hill a machine gun rattled. The 328ᵗʰ needed to get to the top of the hill and into position in order to attack across the valley to the north and west. The division's objective was to take the Decauville railroad, a narrow-

Sergeant York wearing the Medal of Honor May 1919 (Signal Corps photo) gauge railroad about three kilometers west of the hilltop, which was the logistical lifeline of German forces operating in the Argonne forest to the south and west.

Stiff-jointed from the cold, groggy from miles of marching with little sleep, the Americans stumbled out of the ditch cussing and lumbering forward like old men. The mile or so walk to the foot of the hill loosened their joints, and with a collective sigh of resignation they began the climb to the summit. On cue, artillery rounds rained in, and in the excitement someone shouted the alarm "Gas! Gas!" so the suffocating masks were donned, adding a nice twist to a miserable situation.[2] Litter bearers stumbled about the hill in search of American dead and wounded. Germans lay where they fell. The hill was steep, even cliff-like, on the side that backed against the town. The east side provided a reasonable slope, but in ascending the narrow ridgeline soldiers started to bunch up. The NCOs would have none of it, directing and prodding soldiers to spread out and keep their distance. Every now and again an enemy shell would drop in, not that it did much damage, but it was nerve-wracking.

By 0550 they were in position with their masks off again on the jump-off line ready for the 0600 attack. The brigade plan called for the attack to be preceded by an artillery barrage to get the Germans' heads down and weapons suppressed, while the All Americans of the 328th would move forward, exposed, into the valley. The rain that had fallen all night long had turned to light drizzle, as a thick fog gathered and settled into the low-lying areas of the valley before them. For some reason this time of morning, just before sunrise, was always the coldest. They shivered, teeth chattering as they sat, in nervous anticipation of the signal to attack. The weather, the dead, the cries of the wounded, and the notion that there would be more American names to add to the Honor Roll by day's end made for a rather depressing morning.

There was no barrage at 0600, so at 0610, barrage or no, the Americans began to move down the reverse slope of Hill 223 and out into the open valley. Ahead along the line of march to the northwest they could just make out the tops of the hills where the Decauville railroad ran roughly north-south. Somewhere about 600 yards to their front lay the protective concealment of a tree line now obscured by the fog. Then without a hint of warning, the valley exploded with machine gun fire originating from the ridges to the immediate front and left. The ground around the Americans zippered and puckered up as a steady stream of bullets tore into the hillside. Some Americans froze in shock at the violence and surprise of the ambush, while others threw themselves to the ground, clawing at grass and soil in a frantic attempt to get out of the line of fire. Charging forward into the machine guns, as they had been taught to react to situations such as this, was a poor option. The distance to the guns was too great, and the German gunners were just too accurate. The Americans were pinned down on the open slope as German gunners raked the hillside methodically.[3]

The Germans had held these French hills since 1914, and the *2d Württemberg Landwehr Division* had been in this general area for some time. They knew the terrain and had spent time preparing the battlefield,

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positioning their Maxim machine guns in a manner that ensured clear, broad, interlocking bands of fire. True, the gunners' view of their target was obscured by the fog, but the Germans did not have to see the Americans to know that their fire was effective; the cries emanating from the valley told the story. The Americans were stuck between a hail of machine gun bullets and a hard place, and for whatever reason, artillery was not available to save them.

Farther back up Hill 223 in the second wave of the attack, Sgt. Harry Parsons, the platoon sergeant of 1st Platoon, Company G, 328th Infantry, was separated from and out of contact with his company commander, Capt. Edward Danforth. The platoon leader, Lt. K. P. Stewart, was dead. Parsons was now in charge. Taking the initiative as the hail of machine gun bullets whizzed around them, Parsons made a decision. To enable the brigade to get out of the open and into the trees across the valley, Parsons ordered a patrol consisting of three squads to work its way over the ridges and there to attack and silence those machine gun positions that were holding up the battalion. In Parsons's mind this was a one-way mission. Once launched, the patrol might never come back, as its members could well be killed or taken prisoner behind German lines. On the other hand, to sit and do nothing meant the protracted death of the unit.

The 17-man patrol would be led by Sgt. Bernard Early and his section leaders, Cpls. William Cutting, Murray Savage, and Alvin C. York.[4] By day's end Savage and six privates would be dead; Sergeant Early and Corporal Cutting would be severely wounded. As the smoke and mist cleared, Corporal York would march back to friendly lines at the head of a column of 132 German prisoners. Varying historical accounts would credit York with single-handedly defeating a machine gun battalion, killing 25 German soldiers, and capturing 132 prisoners with 35 machine guns. For his heroism that day, York would be awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, the French *Croix de Guerre*, and, on 18 April 1919, the Medal of Honor.

> Only those who have not examined the records can ever doubt that this great American soldier practically single-handedly whipped and captured a German machine-gun battalion.
>
> Thomas J. Skeyhill, *Sergeant York: Last of the Long Hunters* (Philadelphia, 1930), p. 207.

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The officers in York's immediate chain of command and their superiors all the way up through American Expeditionary Forces (A.E.F.) commander General John J. Pershing were skeptical of the reports of Corporal York's exploits. How could one man single-handedly kill two dozen Germans and capture 132 prisoners and 35 machine guns? Several investigations were conducted concerning the events of that day. After the Armistice was signed, newly promoted Sergeant York was ordered in February 1919 to return to the ravine. There he accompanied Brig. Gen. Julian R. Lindsey, his brigade commander, and a host of other senior officers as part of an inquiry to determine whether or not York's feat merited the award of the Medal of Honor.[5] They spent the day walking around the entire area. As they were retracing the route of the patrol back to friendly lines, General Lindsey, whose military career had earlier taken him to China, the Philippines, Cuba, and Mexico, suddenly stopped short, looked Sergeant York in the eye, and asked, "York, how did you do it?"

The reply: "Sir, it is not man power. A higher power than man power guided and watched over me and told me what to do."[6]

Nearly eighty years later a pair of U.S. Army officers entered the ravine west of Hill 223 in search of Corporal York and his story with the same question on our minds: "York, how did you do it?" Since the spring of 1994 we have made frequent visits to the ravine, tracing and attempting to reconstruct the events of the day. Through the course of these visits to the area we believe we have identified the key positions from which German machine guns once controlled the valley. Given these positions relative to the terrain, archaeological evidence, and the tactical situation as presented through military records, we have been able to postulate where, when, why, and how certain events unfolded on that foggy morning of 8 October 1918.

Interestingly enough, Corporal York's chain of command, and more recently this author, weren't the only ones who viewed the scope of York's feat with some degree of skepticism. In November 1928 a Swedish journal published an article concerning York's exploits entitled "The heroic feat performed by an American soldier in the World War." The article incited a German citizen living in Stockholm to submit a translation of the piece to the German minister of war and to request an investigation into York's story.

> War legends usually are based on actual events, the facts of which are greatly embellished by the imagination of the person involved, or of the latter's contemporaries, or of later generations. Whereas the heart of the matter may be historical, the beautification of the feat has no historical value.
>
> "Testimony of German Officers and Men
> anent Sergeant York," 1929, p.1.
> Copy in U.S. Army Military History Institute,
> Carlisle Barracks, Pa.

The task of investigating the German side of the story was assigned to the staff of the *Reichsarchiv*, the German national archives, in Potsdam. The archives staff interviewed all available German officers and soldiers who had played a significant role in the events surrounding Hill 223 on 8 October 1918. The Historical Section of the U.S. Army War College and that office's representative in Berlin, Lt. Col. Carl H. Muller, provided information pertinent to the case from U.S. military archives. The German military then produced a 24-page rebuttal, including the results, analysis, and conclusions stemming from the investigation. The Germans elected not to release the findings of the investigation with the caveat that "If the newspapers should print another article, however, which, in connection with the alleged feat of Sergeant York, might have the tendency of depreciating [*sic*] the name of the German army and, in particular, the German officer, we will immediately disprove this claim with the aid of the material on hand."[7] It should be noted here that while the German investigation team conducted thorough and extensive interviews and analysis, there is no indication that they gathered any information from the actual area surrounding Hill 223 and Châtel-Chéhéry. Continued French antipathy might have precluded such an effort in any event.

Châtel-Chéhéry, Hill 223, and the area we will call York's ravine are located on the Meuse-Argonne battlefield about thirty-five kilometers northwest of Verdun. The area is on the northeastern edge of the Argonne Forest. It is hard to imagine that much has changed in the town of Châtel-Chéhéry over the past eighty years. Maps from the time of the Great War read much the same as the modern maps purchased at the Tourist Information Center in Verdun. While little has changed in the town, even less has changed in the surrounding terrain. The descendants of generations of farmers still work the local fields. The surrounding woods are untouched, save for some local forest management.

For the Americans in 1918, attacking Hill 223 was problematic. The southern slope of Hill 223 backs right up against Châtel-Chéhéry, which the U.S. 28th Division seized on the morning of 7 October. This slope is steep, practically cliff like, and one would imagine it would have been nearly impossible to ascend under fire. The south side of the hill marked the northern border of the area of operations of the 28th Division, which had been organized in the Pennsylvania National Guard. Liaison between the adjacent divisions had been sporadic, so any attempt by the 82d Division to attack Hill 223 from that direction could draw friendly fire and risk fratricide. The 82d's best choice was to attack Hill 223 from the north and east. Nevertheless, two platoons of Company D, 328th Infantry, supported by a detachment from the 28th Division, managed to ascend the south slope without taking hostile fire, reaching the ridgeline shortly after the attack from the north had reached the military summit. There both elements withstood a heavy counterattack that afternoon, and the Germans remained in control of the western slope of the hill overnight.[8]

Today the summit of Hill 223 is covered with hastily dug individual firing positions connected by a communications trench running along its north side, which forms the military crest of the summit. These positions, we believe, were occupied by the German "Battalion Müller," an *ad hoc* organization under the command of Captain Müller, who was killed on Hill 223 on 8 October. The battalion was pieced together from the remnants of other units to defend Hill 223.[9] In our examination of one of these hasty fighting positions, we discovered twenty-five German Mauser Gewahr 98 shell casings, which had undoubtedly been ejected eighty years before from a rifle aimed at soldiers of the 82d Division attempting to take the hill on the evening of 7 October 1918.

It should be mentioned here that the pressure exerted on the Châtel-Chéhéry area by the U.S. 28th and 82d Divisions on 7 October 1918 seems to have compelled the Germans to fall back from their more forward positions across the Argonne forest, thus relieving the famous "Lost Battalion" of the U.S. 77th Division that had been trapped for five days in a ravine five kilometers southwest of Hill 223.[10]

As a point of departure in presenting the results of our search, I have included the essential portions of Sergeant York's official account. This account is supported by affidavits from commissioned officers, noncommissioned officers, and private soldiers who accompanied York in the ravine. Where appropriate, I have inserted observations and analysis concerning the actual terrain as it appears today, coupled with eighty-year-old archaeological evidence of military occupation found in and around the ravine.

First some words concerning our methodology. Neither Ron Bowman nor I are trained historians. We are soldiers, and as such we have approached the analysis of events in the ravine as soldiers would approach a tactical problem, through the application of the METT-T and OCOKA concepts. METT-T stands for **M**ission, **E**nemy, **T**errain and weather, **T**roops and **T**ime available. OCOKA further breaks terrain considerations into **O**bservation and Fields of fire, **C**over and concealment, **O**bstacles, **K**ey terrain, and **A**venues of approach. While exploring Hill 223 and the ravine, we approached our question, "York, how did you do it?" as a tactical problem from both the American and German perspectives. Thus we analyzed how we would have attempted to accomplish Sergeant Early's mission to "work around behind those guns" or, alternately, the mission of a German officer tasked with defending that terrain, applying the principles of METT-T and OCOKA.

The mission of the 328th Infantry was to attack north and west from Hill 223 and to capture the Decauville field railroad. The German mission was to defend that rail system, considered by both the Germans and Americans to be a German tactical "center of gravity." The troops of the U.S. 82d Division, which had arrived in France in May 1918, were fresh compared to the German soldiers of the *2d Württemberg Landwehr Division*, which had been fighting since 1914. The terrain was characterized by heavily vegetated rolling hills, ridges, and ravines. The vegetation throughout the area is still thick today. Visibility and associated fields of fire were about 15–25 meters except in the valley, where they were unrestricted by vegetation or terrain. The weather on 7–8 October 1918 was not unusual for the region during this time of year: it was cold, with rain and fog reducing visibility significantly to 30 meters or less in open areas.[11] As for time, the Germans had occupied these hills since 1914 and had had all the time they needed to prepare the area. The Americans, in contrast, had just arrived on the crest of Hill 223 and were pinned down by effective machine gun fire from unseen positions across the valley in front of them. In their peril, however, the Americans of the 328th Infantry knew that the rest of their lives depended on the ability of Early's patrol to get behind those guns and silence them.

Sergeant York later recounted the action to his superiors as follows:

> Sergeant Harry Parsons was in command of a platoon of which my squad was a part. This platoon was the left support platoon of G Company, my squad forming the extreme left flank of the platoon. The valley was covered by machine-gun fire from the right (pointing at map), from the front, and from the left front. Machine guns from the left front were causing a great deal of damage to our troops advancing across the valley.[12]

Military records show that the 82d Division faced the *2d Württemberg Landwehr Division* and elements of the *45th Reserve Division*.[13] The machine guns employed probably included the Maxim 08 and the lighter Maxim 08/15. Nearly identical in form and function, the 08 was mounted on a tripod, while the 08/15 was mounted on a bipod.

Tracing the route of Parsons's platoon on five separate occasions, we came out each time into the valley, the southern slope of which was recently planted with trees. It is not hard to imagine the scope of damage that a few well-placed Maxim machine guns could wreak on dismounted troops in the open valley. Venturing down into the valley's plowed fields today, it is relatively easy to find rusted bullets and shell fragments.[14] Sergeant Parsons's platoon was part of the second wave, so a good portion of the platoon was still behind the tree line, which provided a modicum of cover and concealment.

Sergeant York's account continued: "Sergeant Parsons was ordered to advance with his platoon and cover our left flank. As the fire was very hot in the valley, we decided to skirt the foot of the hill on our left and thereby gain some protection. We had advanced a little ways . . . when we were held up by machine guns from our left front."[15]

Sergeant Parsons's affidavit explained: "Our first line was mowed down; Lieutenant Stewart was killed and the survivors were forced to dig in. The machine-gun fire was something terrible. If the advance was to be continued, somehow or other the machine guns would have to be put out; and I knew the advance had to be continued at all costs."[16]

Sergeant York again:

> Sergeant Parsons told Sergeant Bernard Early to take two squads and put these machine guns out of business; so my squad being the left squad, was one of those chosen.
>
> We advanced in single file. The undergrowth and bushes here were so thick that we could see only a few yards ahead of us, but as we advanced, they became a little thinner. In order to avoid frontal fire from the machine guns, we turned our course slightly to the left, thereby working around on the right flank of the machine guns and somewhat to their rear, which caused us to miss these forward guns (pointing at the map). As we gained a point about here (pointing at the map and designating a point somewhat in the rear of the machine guns), we turned sharply to the right oblique and followed a little path which took us directly in the rear of the machine guns.[17]

As we stood on the northern slope of Hill 223 some eighty years later, it was clear that skirting the hill to the left was the only option open to Sergeant Early. Skirting the hill and staying well inside the tree line provided a covered and concealed avenue of approach to the rear of the machine gun positions located on the eastern slope of the ridge and in the ravine. Chances are that the patrol had neither a map nor a compass and relied on terrain association and the sound of the machine gun fire to navigate. It is important to note here that this route took the patrol well into the U.S. 28th Division's area of operation. According to a statement made by York's company commander, Captain Danforth, there had been no contact with the 28th Division that morning. Similar problems with coordination existed on the German side. Due to personnel shortages German combat leaders had elected to use strongpoints to defend the valley, which exacerbated breaks in contact between their adjacent units.

German Lieutenant (Reserve) Kübler, a platoon commander in the *4th Company, 120th Landwehr Infantry*, observed:

> At dusk of October 7th, we took up a position West of Castle Hill [Hill 223]. I posted my men for the night and set out to make a final inspection of the company sector, when I saw that we had no contact on our right flank. Immediately I sent out patrols to establish this liaison. The patrols returned during the night with the information that the *2d Machine Gun Company* was located on our right. Personally, I regarded our situation as very dangerous, for the Americans could easily pass through the gaps in the sector of the *2d Machine Gun Company* and gain our rear.[18]

So an analysis of the situation leads us to believe that Sergeant Early's patrol used the concealment afforded by the morning ground fog and dense vegetation to infiltrate the German lines where unit boundaries existed but were not effectively tied in.

Sergeant York's account continued:

> As we advanced we saw two Boche[19] with Red Cross bands on their arms. We called to them to halt, but they did not stop and we opened fire on them. Sergeant Early was leading and I was third.
>
> As I said before, we were proceeding in single file. We immediately dashed down a path, along which the Boche were running, and crossed this stream (pointing at map). The Boche then turned to the right and ran in the direction from which we had come. When we reached the point where they had turned, we stopped for half a second to form a skirmish line. I jumped about four paces away from the sergeant and we told the other men to scatter out because we thought there was going to be a battle and we did not want to be too close together. As soon as we formed our skirmish line, we burst through the bushes after the Boche.
>
> This little stream of which I spoke runs through a gulch into the valley. On either side of the stream there was a little stretch of flat, level ground, about twenty feet wide, which was covered with extremely thick bush. On the east bank of the stream was a hill having an exceedingly steep slope. The hill was somewhat



Map Showing Route of Attack by York's Patrol and the Location of German Machine Gun Nests
(Prepared by Taylor V. Beattie)

> semicircular in shape and afforded excellent protection to anyone behind it. Along the top of the hill were machine guns firing across the valley at our troops.[20]

Locating this stream provided a critical point of reference in our search for the location of Corporal York's exploit. The stream is about a meter wide and takes little more than a step or hop to get across. In his account York speaks of an east bank. The stream runs more nearly west to east, so the banks are to the north and south. In matching the terrain with York's account, we concluded that the patrol crossed the stream from the south to the north. On the north side of the stream there is a steep semicircular hill to which York apparently refers in his account. Along this hill we found the remains of numerous hasty fighting positions and communications trenches. There is also a substantial berm along the outside shoulder of the road running east-west across the hillside. The fields of fire into the valley toward Hill 223 from this section of the road are superb, and, viewed from the ravine, the road with berm could be mistaken for a trench.

Sergeant York's account continued:

> We burst through the undergrowth and were upon the Germans before we knew it, because the undergrowth was so thick that we could see only a few yards ahead of us. There was a little shack thrown together that seemed to be used as sort of a P.C. [command post] by the Germans. In front of this, in sort of a semicircular mass, sat about seventy-five Boche and, beside a chow can, which was near the P.C., sat the commanding officer. The Boche seemed to be having some kind of conference.
>
> When we burst in on the circle, some of the Boche jumped and threw up their hands, shouting "Kamerad."[21] Then the others jumped up, and we began shooting. About two or three Germans were hit. None of our men fell.[22]

The ravine today is relatively open, as the entire area has been clear-cut some time in the last five years. There are no stumps or other evidence that there were ever many large trees in the ravine. The clear-cut removed brush and small trees, one to two inches in diameter. Were these trees and bushes allowed to grow freely, the entire area would be thick with a tangle of ground vegetation competing for the sun's rays. The area around the stream is boggy and made up of sandy soil. There is no evidence of a clearing or shack.

Sergeant York's account continued:

> Sergeant Early said, "Don't shoot any more. They are going to give up anyhow," and for a moment our fire ceased, except that one German continued to fire at me, and I shot him. In the meantime, the Boche upon the hill with the machine guns swung the left guns to the left oblique and opened fire on us. I was at this time just a few paces from the mass of Boche who were crowded around the P.C. At the first burst of fire from the machine guns, all the Boche in this group hit the ground, lying flat on their stomachs. I, and a few other of our men, hit the ground at the same time. Those who did not take cover were either killed or wounded by the Boche machine gun fire, the range being so close that the clothes were literally torn from their bodies. Sergeant Early and Corporal Cutting were wounded, and Corporal Savage was killed. In this first fire we had six killed and three wounded. By this time, those of my men who were left had gotten behind trees, and two men sniped at the Boche. They fired about half a clip each. But there wasn't any tree for me, so I just sat in the mud and used my rifle, shooting at the Boche machine gunners. I am a pretty good shot with the rifle, also with the pistol, having used them practically all my life, and having had a great deal of practice. I shot my rifle until I did not have any more clips convenient and then I used my pistol.
>
> The Boche machine gun fire was sweeping over the mass of Germans who were lying flat, and passing a few inches over my head, but I was so close to the mass of Germans who were lying down that the Boche machine gunners could not hit me without out hitting their own men. There were about fifty Boche with the machine guns and they were under the command of a lieutenant. By this time, the remaining Boche guns had turned around and were firing at us, and the lieutenant with eight or ten Germans armed with rifles [undoubtedly with their bayonets fixed] rushed toward us. One threw a little grenade about the size of a dollar and with a string that you pull like this when you want it to explode, at me, but it missed me by a few feet, wounding, however, one of his own men.[23]

York's diary reported that not quite so many Germans had charged down the hill at him: "Suddenly a German Officer and five men jumped out of the trench and charged me with fixed bayonets. I changed to the old automatic and just touched them off too. I touched off the sixth man first, then the fifth, then the fourth, then the third and so on. I wanted them to keep coming."[24]

Sergeant York's account to his military superiors continued: "I just let the Boche come down the hill and then poured it into them with my pistol and I am, as I said before, a pretty good shot with a pistol. I shot the lieutenant, and when he was killed, the machine gun fire ceased. During the fight I kept hearing a pistol firing from the midst of the Boche who were lying on the ground. This was evidently the commanding officer shooting, as he was the only one in the crowd armed with a pistol, and all of his clips were empty when I examined them later."[25]

While it is commonly thought that Corporal York was armed with a 1903 Springfield, his unit, like most in the AEF, had been issued U.S. model 1917 rifles.[26] The picture of York's sitting in the mud returning fire at the Germans is not very glamorous and would not have worked well for Gary Cooper in the 1941 movie. But when the German machine guns opened fire from the hillside, Corporal York was at the right place, and the Germans fired over his head. We believe that they could not depress the barrels of their machine guns to engage York effectively without exposing themselves to his return fire. (See Sketch 1.)

Sergeant York reports that the Germans then opted for a bayonet charge, hoping to overwhelm him. York variously reports that there were 6–10 Germans involved in the charge. I doubt there were more than 8. Corporal York was armed with a 1911 .45-caliber automatic pistol. This pistol holds a maximum of 8 rounds—7 in the magazine and 1 in the chamber. So had York missed a shot, or had there been more Germans coming down the hill than rounds in his pistol, York's hand-to-hand skills or his ability to run would have come into play.

York's response to the bayonet charge is one of the least documented elements of the day's combat. Pvt. Percy Beardsley of Corporal York's squad attested in February 1919 to York's shooting a German officer leading a bayonet charge toward the group.[27] However, none of the 1929 German affidavits agreed that York had killed any charging Germans. Instead, Lieutenant (Reserve) Glass, who had joined the *1st Battalion, 120th Landwehr Infantry*, that very morning, observed that, while he and his battalion commander were being driven up a hill by Americans who had captured them, "a German officer and several men with fixed bayonets jumped up on our left" and that shouting and yelling ensued. Glass stated that the German officer, whom he identified as engineer Lieutenant Thoma, ultimately surrendered at the behest of Glass's commander. Thoma himself reported surrendering without shots being fired after he and a few of his men had charged blindly, with bayonets fixed, into a group of captured German soldiers under American guard. In drafting York's Medal of Honor citation, U.S. Army officials did not mention this episode.[28]



Sketch 1: York's Firefight with German Machine Gunners

Sergeant York's account continued:

> When the machine guns ceased firing, the commanding officer, who spoke English, got off the ground and walked over to me. He said: "English?" I said: "No, not English." He said: "What?" I said: "American." He said: "Good Lord!" Then he said: "If you won't shoot any more I will make them give up," and I said: "Well, all right, I will treat you like a man," and he turned around and said something to his men in German, and they all threw off their belts and arms and the machine gunners threw down their arms and came down the hill.
>
> I called to my men and one of them answered me from over here, another from over here, and another here (they were pretty well scattered), and when they all come to me, I found that there were six left besides myself.
>
> We searched the Boche and told them to line up in a column of twos. The Boche commanding officer wanted to line up facing north and go down through the valley along the road which runs by the foot of the hill, but I knew if they got me there it would be as good as they wanted on account of the machine guns on the opposite slope, so I said, "No, I am going this way," which is the way I had come, and which led through the group of machine guns placed here (pointing at map), which seemed to be outpost guns. We had missed this machine gun nest as we advanced, because we had gone further to the left.
>
> When we got the Boche lined up in a column of twos, I scattered my men along and at the rear of the column and told them to stay well to the rear and that I would lead the way. So I took the commanding officer and the other two officers and put one in the front of me and one on each side of me, and we headed the column. I did that because I knew that if I were caught on the side of the column the machine gunners would shoot me, but that if I kept in the column they would have to shoot their officers before they could kill me. In this manner we advanced along a path and into a machine gun nest which is situated here (pointing at map).
>
> The machine gunners, as I said before, could not kill me without killing their officers, and I was ready for them. One aimed a rifle at me from behind a tree, and, as I pointed my pistol at him, the commanding officer said: "If you won't shoot anymore, I will tell them to surrender." He did and we added them to our column.[29]

According to his diary entry for the day, Corporal York asked the captured German battalion commander, Lieutenant Vollmer, the direction back to American lines. This again indicates that York did not have a map or a compass. The road Vollmer suggested would have brought them under direct observation of machine gun positions 3, and eventually 1, if they had followed it into the valley west of Hill 223. Had they followed the road west they would have traveled deeper into German-controlled territory. Corporal York instead elected to take the remainder of his patrol and the German prisoners back more or less the "way they had come." This enabled York and the entire contingent to walk up on machine gun position 1. The gunners there would not open fire on the approaching German column and could not engage Corporal York and his fellow Americans, who had shielded themselves with the captured German officers. At this juncture, with two machine gun positions out of action, the Americans on Hill 223 swarmed into the woods, overwhelming the remaining pockets of German opposition.

Later testimony from German soldiers who had been in the ravine indicates that there had been a burgeoning panic within the German lines on the morning of the 8th. Evidently, American patrols in addition to York's had been spotted moving between the German positions, and there was a growing fear that the Americans had rolled the flank and gained the German rear. Both the German Army's leadership in Berlin and the soldiers in the ravine were concerned about the introduction of American forces into the war. On the strategic scale, those in Berlin contemplated the American capability to introduce vast amounts of men and materiel to a conflict that had steadily bled German resources white. On the local scale, here in the ravine, the German soldiers were aware that the Americans were on the whole fresh, well fed, and well motivated.

> I guess they [the Germans] thought the whole American Army was in their rear. And we didn't stop to tell them any different.[30]
>
> Alvin C. York, from his diary
> entry of 8 October 1918

Sergeant York's account to his military superiors concluded: "I then reported with the prisoners to the Battalion P.C. They were counted there and there were 132 of them. I was ordered to deliver the prisoners to Brigade Headquarters, which I did, and returned to my company the next morning."[31]

In Search of York: Man, Myth & Legend

The Man

> I am not definite whether there were still more prisoners, nor how many Americans there were present. On the other hand, I still have in my mind a fairly clear picture of the American soldier in charge; it was he who kept his pistol aimed at me. He was a large and strong man with a red mustache, broad features and, I believe, freckle-faced.[32]
>
> Lieutenant Glass

On 8 October 1918, Corporal York, a draftee from the hills of Tennessee, went out as a member of a patrol. He returned a few hours later in charge of that patrol, leading a column of 132 captured German prisoners. These are historically documented facts. In addition to delivering 132 German soldiers, Corporal York assumed command of a patrol that silenced two of the dominating German machine gun positions that had pinned down American forces in the valley. With the elimination of these two positions, the 82d Division was able to resume the attack north and west and to seize the Decauville field railroad by the end of the day.

Sergeant York at scene of firefight February 1919 (Signal Corps photo)

As the key leaders in his platoon were wounded or killed, Corporal York promptly took charge. With courage, steady aim, and grace under fire, Corporal York dominated a situation that had spun out of control. As the man in command, Corporal York was in a position of responsibility and accountability for the actions of that patrol. At the end of the day, York's patrol had reduced two major obstacles to the movement of U.S. forces through the valley, captured 132 prisoners, and evacuated all wounded associated with the action, both American and German. In view of these historically documented facts, Corporal York's actions were commensurate to, and deserving of, our nation's highest military award. This is the man.

The Myth

> It is probable that Sergeant York of the 328th American Infantry captured several prisoners in the course of this action. . . . The claim that he captured 35 machine guns is an outright lie. I cannot imagine where he could have found 35 machine guns in such a small area, even if he included the light machine guns. I do not believe that 35 machine guns were employed that day in the entire area between Chatel and the North-South Road.[33]
>
> Retired Major von Sick, former commander
> *3rd Battalion, 120th Landwehr Infantry*

Most accounts concerning Sergeant York paint him as a man who, after unsuccessfully applying for conscientious objector status, individually killed 20–28 German soldiers and captured 132 prisoners and 35 machine guns. It appears from published documents that York had indeed sought conscientious objector status, although he denied doing so in his diary.[34] The assertion that York captured 35 machine guns on 8 October 1918 remains unsubstantiated. York did not make that claim, and his Medal of Honor citation, after specifying exactly how many officer and enlisted prisoners his patrol captured, adds that it captured "several guns." However, a report by the 82d Division credited his patrol with the capture of that number of machine guns.[35]

Based on the American affidavits, there is little doubt that Corporal York killed the lion's share of German soldiers in the ravine; however, it is doubtful that he killed them all. In analyzing the events of the day, it is important to remember that there were seven other American soldiers in Sergeant Early's patrol that survived the initial burst of machine gun fire. These soldiers were uninjured and could return reasonably effective fire. Indeed some years after the fact, Sergeant Early and Corporal Cutting were each awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for their actions in the ravine. Overall, we must conclude that the assertions that Alvin C. York single-handedly captured 35 machine guns and killed 28 Germans in the process of defeating a machine gun battalion are all components of the myth.

The Legend

There were well over ninety Medals of Honor awarded for actions during World War I, yet Sergeant York clearly stands out today as the greatest American hero of that conflict. One fact that distinguished Sergeant York from all these other heroes was his homespun American background.

Alvin Cullum York was born in 1887 in a one-room log cabin in the hills behind Pall Mall, Tennessee. Barely able to read, Alvin left school after the third grade to help out on the farm and to work in his father's blacksmith shop. A crack shot with both pistol and rifle, he honed his marksmanship skills from an early age to put food on the table or to win cash at local shooting contests. A heavy drinker, gambler, fighter, and general hell-raiser in his youth, York gave up all these behaviors at the age of 29. He had come home late after a good drunk and found his mother waiting up for him, worried. She asked him when he was going to "be a man like your father and your grandfathers?" The question hit home, and Alvin gave up smoking, chewing, drinking, cussing, fighting, and gambling that night. "When I quit, I quit all," he later wrote.[36]

Alvin York registered for the draft in the summer of 1917. In November 1917 he reported to his initial training at Camp Gordon, Georgia. In December Private York was assigned to Company G, 328th Infantry, 82d Division. The unit arrived in France in May of 1918. After spending time in quiet sectors getting accustomed to the sights and sounds of the battlefield, the 328th was assigned to the St.-Mihiel offensive, where then-Corporal York's unit went over the top for the first time on 12 September 1918. On 24 September York's division was moved to a position in reserve for the Meuse-Argonne offensive. It remained in reserve status until 7 October, when it entered the line on Hill 223.

The events in the ravine on 8 October 1918 came and went. There was hardly time to think about it as Corporal York and the 82d Division slugged on north of the Aire River for two weeks and then consolidated its position abreast the Hindenburg Line, before returning to a reserve status on 31 October. A few days after the fight in the ravine, in fact, York was nearly killed during an artillery barrage while crossing an apple orchard near Sommerance, three kilometers northeast of Fléville. It wasn't until after the Armistice that American public attention began to turn toward the nation's war heroes.

Sergeant York made good copy. His "local boy makes good" story was one the Americans needed and wanted to hear. George Pattullo's article, "The Second Elder Gives Battle," that appeared in the *Saturday Evening Post* on 26 April 1919 gave Sergeant York his initial fame. In 1928 Australian combat veteran Tom Skeyhill, with whom York agreed to collaborate, published *Sergeant York: His Own Life Story and War Diary.* He followed that two years later with *Sergeant York: Last of the Long Hunters*. In the latter book, designed for school children, the author went to great lengths weaving a historical link between Daniel Boone, Davy Crockett, Abraham Lincoln, and Alvin York. Then there was the 1928 Swedish newspaper article, which energized the Germans to provide a painstakingly researched rebuttal. Most today, however, would associate York's exploits with Gary Cooper, who received an Academy Award for best actor for his portrayal of Alvin York in the 1941 war movie *Sergeant York*. While entertaining, the movie bears little resemblance to York's actions in the ravine. However, York's persona portrayed by Gary Cooper was enthusiastically embraced by all. Cooper depicted York as the self-reliant frontiersman—a steadfastly loyal, humble, God-fearing American son who did his duty and beyond.[37] This is the legend.

So, "York, how did you do it?" Some eighty years after the fact, we entered the ravine with an understanding of the "military use of terrain" and the subtle significance in the location of archaeological evidence relative to the tactics, techniques, and procedures of the day. In our analysis of the situation, we pieced all these and other factors together to develop a picture of how events could have unfolded on a foggy fall morning in 1918. The archaeological evidence included actual prepared fighting positions, rolls of barbed wire, discarded ammunition cans, shell casings, a German ration spoon, and even some discarded rails from the Decauville field railroad. The most ominous of these artifacts were the unexploded munitions, including an artillery shell found near the northernmost machine gun position that was fired over eighty years ago by an American artilleryman with the aim of destroying the position. It is, at best, a guess as to the actual events of the ravine. Only the men who fought, struggled, and died in that obscure place know the secrets hidden within.

So in answer to General Lindsey's original question, "How did you do it?" Sergeant York's response, "a higher power than man," is as good an explanation as any that we can conjure. In sum this article suggests that Sergeant York was some of all of the above—man, myth, and legend—an ordinary man who in extraordinary circumstances rose to the occasion and became bigger than life. What's more, Sergeant York is in our final analysis a true American hero, whose exploits—actual, mythical, and legendary—embody the spirit of the thousands of American servicemen who did their duty "over there."

Postscript

There is, at the base of the town hall in Châtel-Chéhéry on the edge of the Argonne forest, a memorial to Sergeant York. Placed there in 1987 by the Tennessee Historical Commission, the memorial contains a marker that recounts in both French and English his exploits of 8 October 1918. Other than this marker, there are no clues to lead the interested individual to the actual site of York's feat. The town is quiet now, save an occasional rooster's crow, but the lingering ghosts of the American presence here some eighty years ago are everywhere. Fifteen kilometers to the south, at the center of the small town of Neuvilly, stands a church that served as an American field hospital during the Meuse-Argonne campaign. Wounded Americans were stretched out bleeding wherever there was space. The suffering was immense, although no more or less so than anywhere else along the Western Front in 1918. Today in that church there is a cart loaded with the carefully prepared flower arrangements of the liturgical season. The flower cart, its wheels and shape barely discernible for the neatly arranged ivy, lilies, and daffodils, has its own history. In another time under different circumstances, that cart bore wounded American soldiers; it is an old U.S. Army field gurney. The gurney serves today as a quiet reminder of a violent and not so distant past.

As we have ventured into York's ravine, we have always been struck with the same notion, a notion that the ground of the ravine is hallowed. This small, lonely patch of French soil, where brave men from the United States and Germany struggled valiantly, witnessed only a miniscule vignette of a world war that would play so significant a part in the history of the twentieth century. While standing on this hallowed ground, one can sense the spirit of the two dozen Germans and six Americans who died there on a foggy October morning in 1918. An American of modest origins from the hills of Tennessee, Alvin York, had killed the lion's share of these Germans and had captured many dozens of their comrades. As a man of faith, York was never particularly proud of his role in the events of the day, but he recognized that he had acted ultimately for what he believed to be right.

Lt. Col. Taylor V. Beattie, a Regular Army special forces officer, is a special operations observer trainer at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has served in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR *in Bosnia and Operation* ASSURED RESPONSE *in Liberia and in assignments in Panama, Germany, Turkey, and Italy. He holds a bachelor's degree in cultural anthropology from the University of Delaware.*

Maj. Ronald Bowman is the resource management officer for the Special Operations Command, Korea, in Seoul, Korea, a civilian position, and an Army Reserve special forces officer. He holds degrees in history and mining engineering from West Virginia University and West Virginia Institute of Technology. Major Bowman introduced Colonel Beattie to American World War I battlefields in France while *the two were serving in Stuttgart, Germany, with the 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group.*

NOTES

1. Quoted in "Sergt. Alvin C. York," Senate Rpt 506, 68th Cong, 1st sess (1924), p. 9.

2. The British gas masks used by U.S. forces incorporated a nose clip and rubber mouthpiece for breathing through the chemical-based filter. It had a horrible claustrophobic effect when worn, which could be for many hours when the Germans deployed gas.

3. This account follows Tom Skeyhill, ed., *Sergeant York: His Own Life Story and War Diary* (Garden City, N.Y., 1928), pp. 217–21. See also *Official History of the 82nd Division, American Expeditionary Forces, "All American" Division, Written by Divisional Officers Designated by the Division Commander, 1917–1919* (Indianapolis, 1920), pp. 53–56, 58–60. In contrast to Skeyhill's book, however, the operational report of the 328th Infantry stated that the 2d Battalion's early morning attack was supported by Stokes mortar fire and one pounders. See Rpt, Lt Col Richard Wetherill, Comdr, 328th Infantry, to Comdr, 82d Division, 3 Nov 1918, in folder 282–33.6, box 21, Record Group (RG) 120, World War I Organizational Records, National Archives (NA), College Park, Md.

4. Skeyhill, *Sergeant York*, pp. 220–22.

5. Lindsey was the commander of the 164th Infantry Brigade.

6. Sgt Alvin C. York's Diary, 8 Oct 1918, as posted on the York Institute web site, *http://volweb.utk.edu/Schools/York/diary.html* [Caps required]. See also Skeyhill, *Sergeant York*, p. 278.

7. Typescript, "Testimony of German Officers and Men anent Sergeant York: A Translation of *The Origin of War Legends, An Investigation of the Alleged Feat of Sgt York, October 8, 1918*," trans. F. W. Merten, p. II, copies in U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., and in file 4658, box 40, Entry 310C, records ("Thomas File") of the Historical Section, Army War College, RG 165, NA.

8. *History of the 82d Division*, pp. 54–56.

9. "Testimony of German Officers," p. 8.

10. *American Armies and Battlefields in Europe* (Washington, D.C., 1938), p. 178.

11. "Testimony of German Officers," p. 8.

12. Skeyhill, *Sergeant York*, pp. 261–62.

13. "Testimony of German Officers," p. 6.

14. The whole Meuse-Argonne battlefield is covered with unexploded ordnance from the Great War. While it should be unnecessary to tell people not to play with these duds, every year people are killed doing just that.

15. Skeyhill, *Sergeant York*, p. 262.

16. Ibid., p. 241.

17. Ibid, p. 262.

18. "Testimony of German Officers," p. 12 (italics added).

19. Boche was a derogatory term applied to the Germans during World War I.

20. Skeyhill, *Sergeant York*, pp. 262–63.

21. All through the war when German soldiers wished to surrender, they would throw up their arms and shout "Kamerad," friend.

22. Skeyhill, *Sergeant York*, pp. 263–64.

23. Ibid., pp. 264–65.

24. York's Diary, 8 Oct 1918, as posted on the York Institute web site; a more detailed and more colloquial version is printed in Skeyhill, *Sergeant York*, p. 228.

25. Skeyhill, *Sergeant York*, p. 265.

26. Paul F. Braim, *The Test of Battle: The American Expeditionary Forces in the Meuse-Argonne Campaign, 26 September–11 November 1918* (Newark, Del., 1987), pp. 43, 96; *History of the 82nd Division*, pp. 3, 11, 12.

27. Skeyhill, *Sergeant York*, pp. 244–47.

28. "Testimony of German Officers," pp. 14, 15, 18, 21, with the quoted words on p. 15; for York's Medal of Honor citation, see U.S. Senate, Committee on Veterans' Affairs, *Medal of Honor Recipients, 1863–1978*, Sen. Comm. Print no. 3 (Washington, D.C., 1979), p. 468.

29. Skeyhill, *Sergeant York*, pp. 265–67.

30. Ibid., p. 225.

31. Ibid., p. 267.

32. "Testimony of German Officers," p. 14.

33. Ibid., p. 8.

34. Skeyhill, *Sergeant York*, pp. 156–63; Sgt Alvin C. York's Diary, 17 Nov 1917, as posted on the York Institute web site.

35. *Medal of Honor Recipients*, p. 468, containing the quoted words; Skeyhill, *Sergeant York*, p. 261.

36. Sgt Alvin C. York's Diary, introduction, as posted on the York Institute web site.

37. David D. Lee, *Sergeant York: An American Hero* (Lexington, Ky., 1985), pp. 53–56, 94–115.

THE CHIEF'S CORNER

John Sloan Brown

It has been a busy quarter, and I am pleased to report significant and impressive contributions across the Army Historical Program. The Korean War commemoration and the Army's 225th birthday have been highly visible events which have relied heavily upon Center of Military History efforts. In June we sponsored a very successful Army historians' conference focusing on the Korean War to which a number of veterans, Center and Army field historians, and military historians from several European nations contributed. Our commemorative pamphlet *225 Years of Service* was particularly well received. It will be reprinted under a camouflage cover in larger numbers with year-end funds. Eventually we hope to see a copy in the possession of every soldier. We also want to ensure that every soldier receives the Chief of Staff's recently promulgated Professional Reading List. The Center coordinated this initiative and the selection of titles, and we do believe that it drives home to our officers and NCOs the importance and value of a thoughtful reading program. Insofar as reading is concerned, we are also proud of our two latest publications, John Carland's Vietnam study, *Stemming the Tide*, and Ed Raines' aviation history, *Eyes of Artillery.*

Our outreach and international programs continue to roll along nicely. This year's military history detachment training at Camp Robinson, Arkansas, was exceptionally well run and successful. Similarly, our participation in the International Commission on Military History in Stockholm yielded favorable results, to include further maturation of the Central European Initiative to bring our new friends and allies ever more closely into our historical community. We are also particularly pleased to have German Lt. Ulrich Humpert from the Bundeswehruniversität in Munich serving as an intern for three months.

CMH has provided in-depth support to the Army's transformation and Quadriennial Defense Review (QDR) efforts, offering decision-makers thoughtful historical perspectives as they prepare the Army's positions for upcoming analyses. We have prepared papers and briefings on a wide range of subjects. These include the Army as a constabulary force, the value to our allies of U.S. ground forces, German initiatives in military modernization and innovation between the two world wars, and the historical creation and modification of U.S. Army major commands and corps headquarters. History, we believe, will play a vital role in both the transformation and QDR processes.

On the museum front, we can all take particular pride in the opening of the Airborne and Special Operations Museum (ASOM). The development of this museum was a model in many ways, and it was the first new museum able to take advantage of our digitized Army Museum Information System (AMIS) in locating desired artifacts. In an effort to enhance the funding of Army museums, we are working to find ways to make them more visible in the Army's Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES).

As always, we do look forward to hearing your thoughts and opinions on these and other subjects.

Fort Bragg Archivist Honored

Donna Barr Tabor, the Fort Bragg and XVIII Airborne Corps archivist, was honored at a ceremony at the Fort Bragg Officers' Club on 11 May as the GS7–9 and equivalent employee of the year 2000. During the year Ms. Tabor completed the preparation of the newly issued video CD, "Fort Bragg: A Century of Progress," and edited and oversaw the publication of the corps and garrison's 1998 annual history. She also provided historical materials and information to the public; contributed some of her own excellent photographs to the Fort Bragg collections; and managed two history web sites, which she designed. She received the award from Lt. Gen. William F. Kernan, the commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg.

Madrid Archive Offers New Perspectives on the Spanish-American War

By Charles Hendricks

The opening in recent years of significant archival collections of interest to the American military in Russia and other former Warsaw Pact nations has overshadowed another archival development that offers detailed information about a military force with which the U.S. Army actually engaged in direct combat. The Military Archives of Madrid in mid-1998 opened to researchers a large and rich collection of Spanish Army documents on Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. If carefully examined, these documents could contribute very substantially to our understanding of the Spanish-American War and of the later colonial histories of those former Spanish territories. This archive contains a broad range of Spanish Army reports and correspondence relating to military operations and administration during the Spanish-American War, the War of Cuban Independence (1895–98), and the Philippine rebellion of 1896–97. The newly opened collections also include smaller but still substantial quantities of documents pertaining to military administration in Cuba during and after the Ten Years' War (1868–78) and in Puerto Rico from 1856 to 1898.

These materials have been made available, accompanied by complete typescript file inventories, in the confines of the Spanish *Servicio Histórico Militar*, the Spanish counterpart of the U.S. Army Center of Military History. The Servicio is located at Calle Mártires de Alcalá 9, not far from the Madrid Metro's Plaza de España station. Researchers should carry to the Servicio a letter of introduction from their educational institution, governmental organization, or military command attesting to their background.

Researchers using the Military Archives of Madrid work in a small but comfortable research room with six to eight tables and several microfilm readers on the ground floor of a high-ceilinged building constructed in the eighteenth century as a school for young noblemen. Adjacent to the document research room is the Servicio's excellent library relating to Spanish military history. Unfortunately, both the library and the research room are open only from 0900 to 1330, Monday through Friday. Photocopying is done only by the staff at a cost of twelve *pesetas* (about nine cents) per page. Large orders may require several days.

The primary series of colonial military records in the Military Archives of Madrid pertain to the Captaincy-General of Cuba (1749–1898), the Captaincy-General of the Philippines (1870–98), and the Captaincy-General of Puerto Rico (1856–98). They comprise 1,820; 103; and 92 archive boxes of records, respectively. The first of these series includes a few eighteenth-century documents relating to engineer defense and building construction, but it focuses on the late nineteenth century with the heaviest concentration relating to the War of Cuban Independence. Noteworthy are seven boxes of papers captured from Cuban revolutionaries, including correspondence from some of their leaders.

Another 333 boxes at the military archives derive from the Overseas (*Ultramar*) Section of the Spanish Ministry of War. Of these, 200 boxes pertain to the Philippines, 44 to Puerto Rico, and only 1 to Cuba. Additional selected documents, often of considerable importance, are contained in the 146 boxes of *Documentación de Cuba* and the 26 boxes of a similar collection on the Philippines. A 235-box series of records on the military governments of Havana, Matanzas, and Pinar del Río includes 40 boxes on campaign operations in those provinces in 1895–98 and 11 boxes relating to defenses and fortifications. A series on the Subinspectorate of Cuban Volunteers contains 243 boxes on these Cuban colonial units organized by the Spanish Army.

During brief visits to the Military Archives of Madrid in 1998 and 1999, I focused my attention on the records of the Captaincy-General of Cuba and more specifically on reports relating to the landing of American soldiers and marines east of Santiago de Cuba in June 1898. The failure of the Spanish land forces under Lt. Gen. Arsenio Linares, commander of the Fourth Army Corps of the Island of Cuba and its Santiago Division, to contest the American landings at Daiquirí and Siboney on 22 and 23 June 1898 has drawn the attention of historians of that war. Walter Millis admitted in 1931 that "the ineffectiveness of light-caliber naval artillery against well-constructed entrenchments was happily not so well understood in 1898," but he nevertheless had to conclude that in withdrawing from their coastal emplacements "the Spaniards had carefully thrown away their best—indeed, their only—chance."[1] David Trask agreed in 1981 that "it is fair to criticize the Spanish general [Linares] for not using available capabilities effectively to inflict damage and create confusion. On this occasion [the American landing at Daiquirí], as on others to come, he missed golden opportunities to delay or discommode if not defeat the invaders."[2]

The records I viewed in the Madrid archives indicate that Linares worked hard to fortify the Cuban coastline east of Santiago and has been blamed for the decision not to defend it largely due to his later efforts to protect his subordinates. The day after the Spanish commander in chief in Cuba, General Ramón Blanco, informed Linares from Havana of the United States' declaration of war, cavalry Col. Domingo Borry reported from Daiquirí the arrival there of engineer Capt. Luis González y González. Captain González carried instructions from General Linares's chief engineer, Col. Florencio Caula, to employ the troops of the Provisional Puerto Rico Battalion, No. 1, to construct trenches at Daiquirí, Siboney, and Aguadores, three coastal towns east of Santiago. Colonel Borry offered to control the Puerto Rican troops' work.[3]

By 5 May Colonel Borry could report that the trenches around the forts of Siboney and Daiquirí had been completed and were ready to be occupied by triple the towns' ordinary garrisons. At Siboney, he reported, two trenches adequate to house 200 riflemen had been constructed on a hill some 200 meters from the coast, allowing the soldiers to fire at anyone trying to disembark there. Forts along the roads to Siboney from Aguadores and Sevilla protected the right and left rear approaches to these trenches. While the steep and rocky character of the hill had prevented widening the trench enough to support a double line of fire, Borry reported that the trench "is very difficult to attack and possesses a situation that cannot be improved." A perpendicular line of trenches ran from this hillside trench to the beach, and two blockhouses on hillcrests surmounted both trenches to prevent an attack on them from the interior by Cuban revolutionaries.[4]

Unfortunately, the operational diaries of the Battalion of Talavera Riflemen, No. 4, two companies of which led by the battalion commander were assigned to defend Daiquirí in June 1898, are not extant. However, General Linares recounted, shortly after he relinquished his command due to wounds suffered near El Pozo on 1 July, that the two companies withdrew from Daiquirí on 22 June in consequence of both the heavy naval bombardment that had destroyed the town itself and a combined flank attack by Cuban rebels and American



Siboney, Cuba, in 1898 (Signal Corps photo) troops that he believed had landed near Point Berracos the day before. This flank attack, he reported, had threatened to cut off the Daiquirí garrison's route of retreat. Linares did not realize, however, that the troops that had come ashore east of Daiquirí on 21 June had not been Americans. Maj. Gen. William Shafter reported that the U.S. Navy had disembarked 500 Cuban insurrectionists at nearby Cujababo on 21 July but mentioned no landing by American troops on that date. Shafter credited the reinforced, 1,000-man contingent under Cuban General Demetrio Castillo with driving the Spanish garrison from Daiquirí on the morning of 22 June.[5] Significant Cuban military contributions of this sort have not been highlighted in American accounts of the Spanish-American War.[6]

While Linares's after-action report states his willingness to see his forces make a disciplined retreat from the coast after the initial landing on 21 June east of Daiquirí, the operational diary of the Expeditionary Battalion of San Fernando, No. 11, provides clear evidence that Linares very much intended to defend the threatened coastline at that time. That diary shows that three of this battalion's companies arrived at Siboney at 0930 on 22 June, having departed El Pozo at 0500 and marched through Sevilla and Guásima, the same route the Americans would take in the opposite direction in forthcoming days. At Siboney they were slated to relieve two companies of the Talavera Riflemen, but they refrained from doing so until 0300 on 23 June due to the naval bombardment directed at the trenches that they were to occupy. The report described the 22 June bombardment as heavy for three hours and then comparatively light, before ceasing at 1600. The Spanish troops meanwhile fired their rifles ineffectively at the ships bombarding them. The San Fernando companies were joined outside Siboney by three companies of the Puerto Rico battalion led by Brig. Gen. Antero Rubín, who assumed command of all the Spanish forces at Siboney upon his arrival there. These forces withdrew from Siboney on the morning of 23 June, when a substantial force under Brig. Gen. Henry Lawton reached the area overland from Daiquirí.[7]

General Linares later accepted responsibility for and defended the wisdom of the decision to withdraw from the fortifications at Siboney, stating that "he did not believe it to be necessary to sacrifice lives sterilely in a senseless fight of rifles against the best and most powerful modern artillery." Nevertheless, the withdrawal clearly contradicted his intentions of the day before, when fresh troops had advanced to Siboney at his orders. Moreover, Linares reported that he had ordered the withdrawal to be made by train to Cruces, while the San Fernando battalion report states that it effected the withdrawal by a different inland route. [8]

As Linares wrote his after-action report on the Santiago campaign, he explicitly anticipated that the Spanish Army's defense of that city might later be the subject of a Spanish government investigation.[9] I believe that this may have led him to accept more personal responsibility than was warranted for questionable battlefield decisions of his subordinates in order to provide political cover to embattled comrades-in-arms and to maintain a united military front in the face of embarrassed Spanish politicians who might be seeking to identify scapegoats. The hasty withdrawal from Daiquirí would, in fact, draw the critical attention of the Spanish press.[10] Linares may well have believed that arguing, after the fact, that modern artillery would have made a stubborn defense of the Cuban coastline a sterile sacrifice of lives would better protect the Spanish military from its civilian critics than would an open acknowledgment of his officers' failure to persist in the very considerable efforts he had undertaken to arrange that any American landing would be strongly contested.

In the event, the Spanish officers who would be tried by Spain's Supreme Council of War were Maj. Gen. José Toral Velázquez, who succeeded Linares in command of the Fourth Army Corps at Santiago on 1 July 1898 and surrendered that city later in July, and the commanders of other localities in eastern Cuba that similarly surrendered to the Americans before the Spanish government agreed to a cease-fire, not Linares or the officers in charge of coastal defenses. In a verdict rendered on 9 August 1899, the council absolved the indicted officers, issuing a rendition of the military situation they faced that drew directly from Linares's after-action report. Evidently, its author well understood the political significance his report could have.[11] Linares's reputation would survive the war nicely, and he would serve as Spain's minister of war a decade later.[12]

As this small inquiry suggests, the newly opened collections at the Military Archives of Madrid contain a broad range of sources on Spanish military operations in its late nineteenth-century colonies. In this case, as always, the careful researcher must evaluate the documents' level of forthrightness and the possibility that facts may have been shaded for political reasons. It is evident, however, that the materials in the Madrid military archives can offer important new perspectives on the operations of the Spanish Army and on the thinking of its leaders as it sought to defend Spain's overseas possessions in the latter half of the nineteenth century. While the majority of the documentation deals with the conflict with local insurrectionists, and does so in very considerable detail, important information about the Spanish response to American military operations in 1898 may also be found in these newly opened files.

Dr. Charles Hendricks is the managing editor of Army History. *His paper on "The Impact of the 'Disaster' of 1898 on the Spanish Army" is posted on the web at* http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/documents/spanam/WS-SpArmy.htm.

NOTES

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2. David Trask, *The War with Spain in 1898*, The MacMillan Wars of the United States (New York, 1981), p. 212.
3. Rpt, Lt Gen Arsenio Linares to Gen Ramón Blanco, 2 Jul 1898, sub: Campaign against the United States, p. 2, box 114; ltr, Col Domingo Borry, Royal Expeditionary Cavalry Regiment, to Linares, 21 Apr 1898, box 116; ltr, Col Florencio Caula to Linares, 24 Apr 1898, box 116, all in Documentación de Cuba, Military Archives of Madrid.
4. Ltr, Borry to Linares, 5 May 1898, box 116, Documentación de Cuba, Military Archives of Madrid.
5. Rpt, Campaign against the United States, pp. 19–20; *Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1898: Report of the Major-General Commanding the Army* (Washington, D.C., 1898), p. 149.
6. Louis A. Pérez, *The War of 1898: The United States and Cuba in History and Historiography* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1998), pp. 81–90.
7. Rpt, Campaign against the United States, p. 19; Operation Diary, Expeditionary Battalion of San Fernando, No. 11, 16–30 June 1898, box 319, Captaincy-General of Cuba, Military Archives of Madrid; *Report of the Major-General*, p. 151.
8. Rpt, Campaign against the United States, pp. 20–21, with the quoted words on p. 20.
9. Ibid., p. 1.
10. Luis Lorente y Herrero, *Bloqueo y Sitio de Santiago de Cuba* (Madrid, 1898), p. 18.
11. "La Capitulación de Santiago de Cuba: Sentencia," *El Mundo Naval Ilustrado*, 1899, pp. 353–54, 373–74. I thank Col. Carlos Zamorano García of the *Servicio Histórico Militar* for bringing this source to my attention.
12. Stanley G. Payne, *Politics and the Military in Modern Spain* (Stanford, Calif., 1967), p. 105.

Romanian Military Documents Finding Aid Published

The Department of Defense's OPEN HOUSE Program has since 1995 developed close relations between the United States and military archives in Poland, Hungary, and Romania. Under this program substantial collections of records from those archives have been microfilmed and deposited in the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C.

The first publication to result from the OPEN HOUSE Program is Volume 1 of *Romanian Military Structures Involved in the Enforcement of the Armistice Agreement and the Treaty of Peace: Finding Aid, 1944–1948* (Bucharest, 1999). This volume prints the armistice agreement between Romania and the Allies signed in Moscow on 12 September 1944 and the peace treaty with Romania signed in Paris on 10 February 1947, and it inventories Romanian archival files relating to these agreements. Microfilmed copies of the documents in those files are now available at the Library of Congress.

Grant Harris of the Library of Congress has a number of copies of the published finding aid available for distribution to libraries and to serious individual researchers. Requests for copies should be submitted to him by email at grha@loc.gov.

The Role of the Horse in Modern Warfare as Viewed in the Interwar U.S. Army's *Cavalry Journal*

By Alexander M. Bielakowski

Following the Mexican Punitive Expedition of 1916, the horse cavalry entered a period during which it was forced to defend its very existence as the issues of mechanization and motorization of the U.S. cavalry came to the fore. Despite the fact that during World War I the Eastern Front was characterized by mobile warfare and the employment of large cavalry formations, the stalemate of trench warfare on the Western Front became the defining image of the war throughout the world. While cavalry remained idle in the west, the invention of the tank and its successful use in France added to the belief that the day of the horse cavalry had passed. Most references in the historical literature to American cavalrymen during the interwar period treat them as nothing more than anachronistically oriented individuals unable to grasp the significance of the new military technology then becoming available. In fact, however, throughout the 1920s and 1930s cavalrymen were willing to integrate new technology into the structure of their branch. In 1931, for instance, the independent Mechanized Force was dissolved, and its assets were transferred to the 1st Cavalry Regiment, which was reorganized as a mechanized cavalry regiment. This article will examine the military role that American cavalrymen of the interwar period envisioned for the horse in the pages of the *Cavalry Journal*.

Despite the great limitations the First World War placed on the use of cavalry, many soldiers, whether cavalrymen or not, believed that the war was by no means a completely negative experience for the horse-borne arm. General John J. Pershing, the commander of the American Expeditionary Forces in France, who was himself a cavalryman, stated in a "Message to the Cavalry" in 1920 that "During this period [World War I] all arms had a chance for development and employment except the Cavalry, so that to some unthinking persons the day of the cavalry seems to have passed. Nothing could be farther from the truth."[1]

Even as tanks and mechanized vehicles—half-tracks and armored personnel carriers—gained increasing prominence in interwar military planning, Pershing's opinions on the continued value of the horse gained noteworthy adherents from the ranks of other leading military powers. Field Marshal Viscount Allenby, who had commanded British forces in the Middle East during World War I, observed: "The armoured vehicle requires, oil, water, petrol, in large amounts; spare parts and skilled mechanics; to keep it in working order. Except in arid desert, the horse can subsist on the produce of the country. The horse can live—and do his work—on one good drink in 24 hours; he can stand extreme cold and extreme heat. In hot climates, the heat of a tank is unendurable to its crew."[2]

Military notables from Germany and France agreed. German Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg stated that "Cavalry will continue to be important. There were many times when I wished I had more of it."[3] The German Army's inspector of cavalry, Lieutenant General von Kaiser, said "Every new means of transportation appearing seems to be followed by a cry for doing away with the cavalry. Thus in a book which appeared in 1871 I found many persons considered cavalry superfluous, as they claimed the progress made in railway transportation was replacing it. Now it is the same with the motor."[4] French General Henri Pétain stated, "Cavalry remains the favored arm for reconnaissance and screening before battle and for the exploitation of success after battle."[5] The future French chief of staff, General Maxime Weygand, believed that "The rôle of cavalry far from being diminished will appear on the morrow, if there is another war, as great as we deemed it to be in the past."[6]

Soon after World War I, 1st Lt. Anthony J. Tittinger of the 6th Cavalry wrote that the nature of combat in that war was unique and should not, in his view, be taken to indicate that the cavalry had somehow become obsolete. Tittinger believed that, had the Germans possessed more cavalry during the opening phase of the war, they could have avoided the needless slaughter of the trenches. "The German retreat and subsequent defeat at the Marne were due to an insufficient amount of cavalry in the army group of Von Kluck (1st Corps of Cavalry), who was opposing Foch near Mailly." The lesson to be learned from this campaign, according to Tittinger, was that nations should maintain a large cavalry force among their active armies to prevent "position" or trench warfare. He also believed that the invention of the tank was unlikely to have an effect on the cavalry. The tank, Tittinger stated, was useful only "in trench or siege warfare or, with our overseas garrisons, to prevent landing parties," as "they have a limited a radius of action and have a limited fuel capacity."[7]

In a 1922 article entitled "What the World War Did for Cavalry," Maj. George S. Patton, Jr., agreed with Tittinger that the Western Front in the First World War was unique. That was the case, in Patton's view, because there were "fixed flanks," which prevented the maneuver for which cavalry was best suited, and because the contested area was supported by "a splendid rail and road" network on both sides, which permitted a very heavy concentration of men and a relatively easy ammunition supply. Patton emphasized the very different circumstances that existed on the Eastern Front and in the Middle East. In Palestine, for instance, sixteen of the seventeen mounted cavalry charges that were attempted against infantry in position proved successful, he observed.[8]

Patton acknowledged that several technological developments that had occurred during World War I had forever altered warfare. The airplane and the tank were, in Patton's opinion, the most significant of these developments. Patton believed that the airplane had changed the definition of "good cavalry country." While cavalrymen had previously believed that wide-open spaces, such as the American prairie, were ideal for the use of cavalry, the military airplane left those areas vulnerable to air reconnaissance, which could reveal lines of supply and communication. Patton believed that the airplane would change the desired countryside for the cavalry from grasslands to woodlands, where the cavalry would be able to use the cover of trees to screen its approach.[9]

Regarding the tank, Patton believed it would be most successful in limited operations, being too tightly tethered to its supply lines to be used in coordination with cavalry on more extensive attacks and too expensive to be produced in large enough quantities to replace the horse. Despite his many critiques of the tank, however, Patton had from the start advocated the creation of a separate and independent Tank Corps.[10]

U.S. Army Team White—Maj. John Eager, Lt. Gordon Rogers, Major Patton, and Maj. Jacob Devers—Receiving the Argentine Polo Cup, July 1931 (Signal Corps photo)

As no suitable tanks or truly mechanized vehicles yet existed and as the Army's budget could not accommodate a broad-based mechanization program in any event, Patton recommended in 1924 that each cavalry brigade be equipped with nine armored cars to enhance its mobility and firepower.[11] The Army responded positively to Patton's recommendations four years later, when Secretary of War Dwight Davis authorized the formation of an armored car platoon in the 1st Cavalry Division, then headquartered at Fort Bliss, Texas.[12]

By 1930, major technological changes had improved the tank well beyond the lumbering five-mile-per-hour contraptions employed during the First World War. Once again, Patton's opinions appeared in the *Cavalry Journal*, this time to advocate new cooperation between tanks and the existing combat branches. Patton believed that the infantry and the cavalry should develop different kinds of tanks to fulfill markedly different roles. The infantry needed heavily armed and armored tanks, which could accompany and support infantry advancing on foot. These tanks' speed would not be an issue. The cavalry, on the other hand, required fast cross-country machines, which could keep up with and protect horse cavalry formations.[13] The coauthor of this article, Maj. Charles C. Benson, was the cavalry's representative during the trials of the Christie tank in 1928. Could the remarkable performance of the Christie tank chassis design have had something to do with Patton's change of heart regarding the use of tanks with horse cavalry?

By 1931, the new Army chief of staff, General Douglas MacArthur, realized that the U.S. Army was sorely in need of modern equipment, and he extended the mechanization and motorization program that was already in effect. MacArthur thought that it was a misconception to believe that the cavalry mission must be accomplished by men on horseback, and he moved to incorporate tanks into the cavalry by reorganizing the existing Mechanized Force as a reinforced cavalry regiment. MacArthur presented his reasoning as the follows: "Modern firearms have eliminated the horse as a weapon, and as a means of transportation he has generally become, next to the dismounted man, the slowest means of transportation. In some special cases of difficult terrain, the horse, properly supplemented by motor transportation, may still furnish the best mobility, and this situation is properly borne in mind in all our plans."[14]

MacArthur foresaw a general reorganization and reequipment of the cavalry in which at least two types of cavalry regiments would exist side by side. Traditional cavalry regiments would rely on horses and mules and would be used only where motor vehicles could not be employed due to difficult terrain or unique tactical missions. A second, mechanized type of cavalry regiment would be formed with tanks, armored cars, and trucks, but without any horses at all.[15]

Later that year retired Brig. Gen. Hamilton S. Hawkins, who became a great defender of the horse cavalry, tried to dispel what he saw as a myth then grasping the public's imagination. This was the view, popularized by the American media, that the horse was doomed in the military and that the War Department wished to mechanize the entire cavalry as soon as the necessary funds could be provided. Hawkins was correct that the War Department had not announced such a goal. Hawkins, however, went a step further by saying, "There is an idea prevailing among some officers that the Mechanized Force is to be assigned Cavalry missions in what is termed ordinary country, and Cavalry kept for work in difficult country. This idea is very false and dangerous. . . . Mechanized Force will be able in suitable terrain to take over a few of the smaller or less important missions; but in any country whatever, whether suitable for Mechanized Force or not, the more important Cavalry roles must be undertaken by Cavalry."[16] In making these assertions, Hawkins was directly contradicting the statements made by General MacArthur which had appeared in the *Cavalry Journal* just four months earlier.

Maj. Gen. Guy V. Henry, the chief of cavalry, reported in the *Cavalry Journal* in 1932 on the organization and state of mechanization in the cavalry of various nations, including the United States. He stated that only two of the twenty-two cavalry regiments in the British Army at that time had been mechanized, but illustrated that the level of mechanization and motorization in the British Army was greater than those figures would indicate. The British divided their forces into mobile troops, which consisted of horse cavalry and armored car brigades, and combat troops, which consisted of infantry and tank brigades. Unlike the Americans, the British believed that cavalry and armored cars could best be used together in a reconnaissance role, where the superior mobility of the horses and the offensive power of the armored cars would complement each other nicely.[17]

Henry reported that the French Army was also moving toward mechanization and motorization, and he predicted that France would eventually make some of its cavalry divisions completely horseless. At the time Henry wrote the article, however, only two of the six regiments in each French cavalry division were mechanized or motorized. These were a portée dragoon regiment composed of riflemen transported in Citroen half-tracks and a regiment of armored cars. The German Army, while restricted by the Versailles Treaty, maintained a cavalry that was approximately 16 percent of its total size, a significantly higher proportion than that of either the United Kingdom or France, each of whose cavalries made up about 7 percent of their armies. The Germans were still unable to possess armored cars or tanks at this stage, but Henry believed that Germany would add them to its cavalry units were it not for the Versailles Treaty.[18]

Discussing the U.S. cavalry, Henry observed that although an American horse cavalry division could muster a greater rate of small arms firepower per man than its European counterparts, an American cavalry division possessed only one armored car squadron and one tank company. Likewise, the division lacked sufficiently mobile trucks to move its supplies and had too few antitank or antiaircraft weapons. In Henry's opinion an American cavalry division was under-motorized, under-mechanized, and under-armored. Henry also discussed the mechanized cavalry regiment that the U.S. Army was developing and commented favorably on mechanized cavalry's potential "shock power" and its ability to engage in distant reconnaissance. He expressed the view that horse and mechanized "cavalry both fulfill the missions of cavalry within their respective powers and limitations" and "that the War Department is right in incorporating completely mechanized units within our cavalry."[19]

In 1937 Hawkins, who was not about to be dissuaded by the assertions of either the chief of staff or the chief of cavalry, again contributed to the pages of the *Cavalry Journal* with an article entitled "We Must Have Cavalry." Hawkins cited the current or recent conflicts in Spain, China, and North Africa as examples showing how the traditional arms had remained effective in modern warfare. In open warfare, where there were no trenches or barbed-wire entanglements, horse cavalry would continue to prove useful, Hawkins believed. Hawkins had by that point begun to recognize that technological development had markedly enhanced the effectiveness of tanks. His solution was to advocate the use of cavalry in support of tanks, in much the same way as infantry had been used to support tanks in the First World War. The cavalry, Hawkins argued, could keep up with the tanks more easily and cheaply than could infantry, as the infantry would have to become mechanized, or at the least motorized, to fulfill that mission.[20]

At the end of the 1930s, most American cavalrymen, including Maj. Gen. John K. Herr, the Army's last chief of cavalry, continued to support a mixed force of horse and mechanized cavalry.[21] In the spring of 1939, defense analyst George F. Eliot discussed, in an article entitled "The Future of American Cavalry," the missions for which he believed horse and mechanized cavalry were best suited. He judged horse cavalry particularly well adapted for the defense of the Western Hemisphere. Eliot called for the formation of a cavalry corps, along with three infantry corps, in the U.S. Army. The cavalry corps would be made up of two mechanized cavalry divisions and two horse cavalry divisions. This arrangement would have left five unassigned horse cavalry regiments for use as corps cavalry, with one or more cavalry regiment for each infantry corps.[22]

In 1940 reserve Brig. Gen. Henry J. Reilly argued that the Spanish Civil War proved the continued viability of horse cavalry. Reilly, who had spent much of 1938 as an observer with General Francisco Franco's Nationalist forces, likened the situation in Spain to that of the American Civil War, rather than the First World War. "There were places in which each side was entrenched and large forces faced each other. There were others where there were lighter entrenchments lightly held. Everywhere there were long gaps in which no trenches of any kind existed." In this situation, the Nationalist cavalry proved well situated to attack the weak flanks and rear of Republican positions, drawing support when needed from aviation assets.[23]

Even the opening battles of the Second World War did not dissuade the supporters of horse cavalry. The Polish campaign, according to Reilly, far from being proof that the days of horse cavalry were over, supported the lessons of Spain. The Polish cavalryman was poorly armed and his units lacked supporting antiaircraft and antitank guns, were supported by few tanks or other mechanized vehicles, and had no air support after the Polish air force was defeated in the first two days of the war. Reilly concluded, "Judging from Spain, had Poland's cavalry possessed modern armament in every respect and been united in one big cavalry command with adequate mechanized forces included, and supported by adequate aviation, the German light and mechanized forces might have been defeated."[24]

The U.S. cavalry's solution of the ongoing problem of how to coordinate horse and mechanized cavalry was the formation of the horse-mechanized regiment. The horse-mechanized regiment consisted of a headquarters troop, a service troop, a squadron of truck-borne horse cavalry, and a mechanized squadron equipped with 88 scout cars and 171 motorcycles. Describing his own 6th Cavalry Regiment, which was the U.S. Army's first horse-mechanized regiment, Maj. Thomas J. Heavey made it clear that this type of regiment was intended to be used as corps level reconnaissance, rather than in a front-line combat role, but he observed that its heavy firepower would enable commanders to employ it as "an ideal highly mobile, hard-hitting reserve."[25] In 1940 two Regular Army and seven National Guard cavalry regiments were reorganized as horse-mechanized.

Four days before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, General Herr, the chief of cavalry, addressed an annual meeting of the Horse and Mule Association of America. In his speech, reprinted in the *Cavalry Journal* under the title "Why Should the United States Lag behind Other Great Powers in the Military Use of Animals?" Herr compared the use of the horse and mule in the German and American armies. The German Army, he observed, was using almost one million horses and mules, some 50,000 for cavalry and over 900,000 for draft and pack purposes. The United States, by comparison, used 25,000 animals for cavalry and only 12,000 horses and mules for draft and pack purposes.[26]

In his address, Herr argued that the United States was overextending its industrial base by refusing to use horses and mules for transportation in infantry divisions, which, he observed, could move no faster than draft animals in any event. He supported his argument with statements favorable to horse-drawn artillery that had been made by the chief of field artillery, Maj. Gen. Robert M. Danford. Herr believed that American industry could not sustain production levels sufficient both to equip American forces and to provide needed military support to its allies. He argued that the United States should adopt a policy for the use of animals similar to that of the German Army, "thereby releasing the products of industry for other vital needs." The Germans used fleets of trucks only for the long haul of supplies from staging areas to infantry division headquarters. They used animal transport to move the supplies within the division itself, as the infantry could not march faster than horse-drawn vehicles. In the United States, Herr commented, "the motor-mad advocates are obsessed with a mania for excluding the horse from war. This idea always gets a favorable press."[27]

Herr also argued that the German Army, which used its horse cavalry regiments as corps reconnaissance, its cavalry troops as division reconnaissance, and its cavalry platoons as regimental reconnaissance, spread its cavalry formations too thin. Larger cavalry formations could, according to Herr, have acted as the perfect flank support to the armored and mechanized divisions of the German Army. Cavalry could have prevented Russian forces from so frequently interposing between German motorized infantry and foot divisions, have protected isolated German armored units from being surrounded and destroyed, and have coped better with Soviet guerrilla tactics.[28]

During the interwar period, a struggle raged within the U.S. cavalry. Many cavalrymen clung desperately to the horse despite the advent of the tank, while others immediately grasped at any new mechanized technology before its battlefield effectiveness could truly be determined. In 1935 Lt. Col. Jonathan M. Wainwright, assistant commandant of the Cavalry School, observed: "The Cavalry School is accused by the strong proponents of the horse of being too mechanical minded, and, by the stout supporters of mechanization, of being over 'horsey.' Both arraignments are absurd. The Cavalry School and the Cavalry Service use the horse and the machine each in its proper sphere of action, and each in cooperation with the other."[29]

Wainwright's assertion regarding the Cavalry School is a fitting description of the attitude of the U.S. cavalry as a whole. During the interwar period, American cavalrymen held off reaching a final decision between the military value of the horse and the motor vehicle, believing that each would strengthen their Army's forces. With hindsight, the judgment of history has clearly been on the side of mechanization, but as the United States entered World War II, the verdict was not yet clear.

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NOTES

1. John J. Pershing, "A Message to the Cavalry," *Cavalry Journal* (hereafter *CJ*) 29 (April 1920): 5–6.

2. Edmund H. H. Allenby, "The Future of Cavalry,"

CJ 38 (January 1929): 2.

3. George S. Patton, Jr., and Charles C. Benson, "Mechanization and Cavalry," *CJ* 39 (April 1930): 234.

4. Guy V. Henry, "The Trend of Organization and Equipment of Cavalry in the Principal World Powers and Its Probable Rôle in Wars of the Near Future," *CJ* 41 (March–April 1932): 7.

5. Ibid., p. 6.

6. Ibid.

7. A. J. Tittinger, "The Future of Cavalry," *CJ* 29 (April 1920): 67–69, with the quotations on pp. 67 and 69.

8. George S. Patton, Jr., "What the World War Did For Cavalry," *CJ* 31 (April 1922): 165–72, with the quotations on p. 165.

9. Ibid., pp. 169–70.

10. George S. Patton, Jr., "Comments on 'Cavalry Tanks'," *CJ* 30 (July 1921): 251–52.

11. George S. Patton, Jr., "Armored Cars with Cavalry," *CJ* 33 (January 1924): 5–10.

12. "Cavalry Adopts Armored Cars," *CJ* 37 (April 1928): 300.

13. Patton and Benson, "Mechanization and Cavalry," pp. 237–38.

14. "Mechanized Force Becomes Cavalry," *CJ* 40 (May–June 1931): 5.

15. Ibid., p. 6.

16. Hamilton S. Hawkins, "Cavalry and Mechanized Force," *CJ* 40 (September–October 1931): 19.

17. Henry, "Cavalry in the World Powers," pp. 5–6.

18. Ibid., pp. 6–7.

19. Ibid., pp. 8–9, with the quotations on p. 9.

20. Hamilton S. Hawkins, "We Must Have Cavalry," *CJ* 46 (September–October 1937): 406.

21. John K. Herr, "What of the Future?" *CJ* 48 (January–February 1939): 6.

22. George F. Eliot, "The Future of American Cavalry," *CJ* 48 (May–June 1939): 194–99.

23. Henry J. Reilly, "Horsed Cavalry and the Gas Engine's Children," *CJ* 49 (January–February 1940): 4–6, with the quoted words on p. 4.

24. Ibid., p. 9.

25. Thomas J. Heavey, "The Horse-Mechanized Regiment," *CJ* 49 (September–October 1940): 424.

26. John K. Herr, "Why Should the United States Lag behind Other Great Powers in the Military Use of Animals?" *CJ* 51 (January–February 1942): 23.

27. Ibid., pp. 23–25, with the quoted words on p. 25.

28. Ibid., p. 26.

29. Jonathan M. Wainwright, "Mobility," *CJ* 44 (September–October 1935): 20.

Book Reviews

Book Review
by John M. Carland

Britain as a Military Power, 1688–1815
by Jeremy Black
UCL Press, 332 pp., $40

The historical forces that had united disparate national groups in the British Isles—the English, Scots, Welsh, and Irish—under a single government by the eighteenth century are now dissipating and may quite possibly disappear. When that happens, Great Britain, the political construct that these forces allowed to emerge, will probably disappear too, its constituent pieces absorbed into a greater Europe. The British crown will then revert to an English one. If this does come to pass, it will be all the more important that we have Jeremy Black's study to explain what might increasingly appear to be inexplicable, almost fantastic: how and why a small state composed of a group of islands off the northwest coast of Europe became a great military power in the eighteenth century and the strongest nation in the world by 1815. Black writes in plain English, free of jargon, and the book is a pleasure to read. If a paragraph occasionally degenerates into a list of engagements or events and the reader's attention wanders, Black recaptures it quickly with a smartly turned phrase, an appropriate quotation, or a sharp piece of analysis.

The heart of the book's argument is that success in war results from military effectiveness, not from a certain kind of government or from economic resources. To be sure, Black knows that a stable, effective, and responsive government and a strong economy favor success in war. But these factors constitute the preconditions, not the conditions, of victory. The latter, Black contends, must be found in the old standbys that immediately inform fighting ability, "tactics, strategy, morale and social-military characteristics such as discipline and leadership." Even then, as the Duke of Cumberland observed in 1757, "no mortal can answer for success in military affairs." (p. 5) Black knows this and makes uncertainty a part of his intellectual apparatus, noting that "it is a central thesis of this book that Britain's rise in and to power was not inevitable, and that it had to be fought for." (p. 10)

If this is so, why did Britain fight? It fought not for world conquest and not because of any plan. "Instead, British military activity arose in response to particular circumstances, most of which were unpredictable and to which the necessary response was both unclear and controversial." (p. 9) The "particular circumstances" oscillated from perceptions of threats to Britain's national survival to challenges to the nation's interests abroad.

Black's organization of *Britain as a Military Power* derives from his observation that Britain operated militarily in four spheres, while his argument originates in the notion that by conducting operations in each sphere Britain developed multiple military capabilities and practiced them better than anyone else. The British response to public disorder and rebellion is the first of the four spheres. Lacking national police or effective local police forces, the British made the military responsible for the maintenance of law and order. More significant than its routine police duties was the British military's response to rebellions such as that of the deposed King James II in Ireland in 1689–91; the attempts by the Jacobites in 1708, 1715, and 1745 to regain the throne for the Stuarts; the revolt in the American colonies in 1775–83; and the 1798 bid by Wolfe Tone to free Ireland from the British crown.

A common factor connecting these rebellions, which were either attempts to topple the reigning monarch or to attain national independence, was that the insurgents assumed that success required outside help, usually from France or Spain. In the American uprising, French military assistance proved critical to the rebels. However, in the other instances military support proved insufficient or untimely. In each case a single variable explained the level of intensity of the regime's response to a rebellion: its geographical proximity to England, the heart of Great Britain. The Jacobite revolts, though much smaller in scale than the American Revolution, represented a greater hazard to the British government than the crisis in the American colonies. Why? Because Jacobite rebellions in Scotland and northern England "could readily threaten the centres of British power," (p. 34) while the American dilemma, though it might result in independent ex-colonies, posed no fatal danger to the monarch or the state. Therefore, not surprisingly, the British vigorously and ruthlessly quelled the rebellions in the British Isles while failing to bring the Americans to heel.

The second sphere focuses on Britain as a European land power. Black examines British participation in the plentiful continental campaigning of the eighteenth century—in the Nine Years' War (called the War of the League of Augsburg in my school days), the War of the Spanish Succession, the War of the Austrian Succession, the Seven Years' War; and the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Britain and France always opposed one another in these conflicts, and British governments always refused to act alone on the Continent, thus assuring that coalition warfare would become and remain the behavioral norm. Despite finding the "transition to coping with the demands of continental warfare particularly difficult" (p. 6) and despite performing badly at the beginning of almost every war, British leaders and armies eventually emerged victorious.

Put simply, Britain's great captains "understood that generalship entailed the application of resources [to fighting]." (p. 58) John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, arguably the most brilliant British commander on the Continent in the eighteenth century, demonstrated his operational and tactical talents during the War of the Spanish Succession. At Blenheim, his most famous battle, he revealed an extraordinary capacity to integrate cavalry and infantry, develop an aggressive cavalry, and move artillery rapidly across the battlefield to support breakthroughs into the enemy line. As captain-general of the coalition army arrayed against France, he engaged and defeated the enemy in a series of battles between 1704 and 1711. Other coalition forces—Austrian, Dutch, and German—no doubt helped, but the heart of the army was British. As they were meant to, Marlborough's battlefield victories translated into leverage and influence for his nation at treaty negotiations, thus helping to solidify Britain's growing power.

When Great Britain was dominant on the high seas—the third sphere of activity—its commercial goods, military supplies, and troops moved safely and expeditiously to wherever they were needed; equally important, the enemy's did not. The operational difficulties faced by warships powered by wind, however, remained substantial throughout the period:

> The optimal conditions for combat were to come from windward in a force 4–6 wind across a sea that was relatively flat; it was more difficult to range guns in a swell. Limitations on manoeuvrability ensured that ships were deployed in line in order to maximize their firepower. The skill in handling ships entailed getting wind behind the topsails. As battles arose from chance encounters, much had to be left to the discretion of commanders. . . . It was difficult both to achieve battle and to obtain victory. (p. 6)

Still, it did happen, and on most occasions, as at Barfleur (1692) and Trafalgar (1805), British warships prevailed. Over time, superiority at sea came to be a bedrock reality for the nation's leaders and played a crucial role in the defense of Britain and the defeat of France. "Thanks to her naval strength," Black concludes, "Britain could be a world power, France only a European one." (p. 221)

On the rare occasion that Great Britain lost its mastery of the seas, its ability to transport forces across oceans or within theater, and to supply and protect them, became difficult if not impossible. For example, after France and Spain entered the American War of Independence on the side of the rebels, the combined tonnage of their warships, mostly French, surpassed that of the British by 25 percent. In American coastal waters this could translate into the French naval superiority which, at a critical moment, prevented the relief of the British army at Yorktown. When that army surrendered to a Franco-American force commanded by George Washington, it effectively ended the war, with the colonies victorious.

British naval superiority also made possible the conduct and predominant success of Britain's transoceanic land conflict, the fourth sphere. British forces, or colonial forces fighting on Britain's behalf, campaigned in practically every corner of the world between 1688 and 1815. Such campaigning occurred primarily within the framework of war between or among European principals. British forces engaged and defeated European armies—French, Spanish, and Dutch—and their non-European allies in India, the Philippines, South Africa, West Africa, Latin America, and, except during the contest for American independence, in the West Indies and North America. Differences in these areas' climate and terrain and in the military sophistication of those whom they fought gave the British incomparable combat experience.

Throughout the century Britain's Army and Navy performed admirably and successfully across the globe. The consequences were immense for Britain and the world. In the words of imperial historian P. J. Marshall, Britain by 1815 had "swept the board."[1] It had decisively defeated the French Army; effectively destroyed the navies of France, Spain, and Holland; and gained direct or indirect control over large portions of the world, both from European antagonists and local powers. Naval and military victories allowed Britain a near-global ascendancy over commerce and contributed to its ability to influence politics, culture, and language almost everywhere. Great Britain had reordered the world, becoming in the process, the author concludes, "the strongest state in the world." (p. 267)

Has Jeremy Black made his case? He has, although not precisely as intended. Indeed, few would seriously challenge his key conclusions—that Britain became a global military power in the eighteenth century and the strongest anywhere after 1815. Neither his story nor his findings are new. However, three things are, and they make the book valuable. First, by organizing his material into the four spheres, he has found a new and intriguing way to give narrative and analytical clarity to 127 years of complex history. Second, by explaining the British achievement as a function of the development and application of multiple military capabilities he has staked out novel theoretical ground. In passing, one might add that although he has related his theory to historical data, he should flesh it out and demonstrate causal connections with more explicit logic and specific evidence. And third, the notion that victory in battles, campaigns, and wars transformed Britain into a great power provides a needed, albeit retrospectively obvious, corrective to more broadly based political and economic interpretations.

All who are interested in eighteenth century military history and in the rise of Great Britain as a military power should read this book. Jeremy Black has compressed a complicated military history into about 300 pages of exciting, interesting, and provocative prose.

NOTES

1. P. J. Marshall, "Britain without America," in *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, 2 vols. to date (Oxford, England, 1998–), 2: 594.

Dr. John M. Carland has worked in the Histories Division of CMH since 1985. After receiving his Ph.D. in history from the University of Toronto, he taught imperial, English, and Canadian history at the University of Kentucky. He is the author of The Colonial Office and Nigeria, 1898–1914 *(Stanford, Calif., 1985) and* Combat Operations: Stemming the Tide, May 1965 to October 1966 *(Washington, D.C., 2000), a volume in Center's series, the U.S. Army in Vietnam.*

Book Review

by Keir B. Sterling

Sword and Olive Branch: Oliver Otis Howard

by John A. Carpenter

Second Edition, Fordham University Press, 1999

379 pp., cloth $35, paper $19.95

Maj. Gen. Oliver Otis Howard (1830–1909), who graduated fourth in the West Point class of 1854, has suffered from much bad press during the past 137 years. Originally an ordnance officer, he became a colonel of Maine volunteers at the onset of the Civil War and subsequently commanded at the brigade, division, and corps levels. Awarded the Medal of Honor for leading a charge of the 61st New York Volunteer Infantry at the Battle of Fair Oaks, Virginia, in June 1862, Howard was twice wounded in his right arm, necessitating its amputation. No less an authority than Maj. Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman opined that Howard was a brave and conscientious officer whose Civil War career was "entirely satisfactory," though he added that Howard was also credulous, making him "easily used and influenced."

Following the Civil War, Howard was the first and only head of the Freedmen's Bureau (1865–74). He negotiated a peace agreement with the Apaches in the Southwestern territories in 1872 and six years later compelled Chief Joseph of the Nez Percé Indians to end his resistance to American authorities. Howard, who had become an evangelical Christian during his service in Florida in the 1850s, founded Howard University in 1869 and served as superintendent of the Military Academy in 1881–82. During his twenty-month tenure at West Point, he did much to improve the food served to the cadets in the academy's mess hall. He subsequently commanded Army departments and divisions on the Great Plains and along the Pacific and Atlantic coasts, before retiring in 1894.

Howard's skills as a combat leader during the Civil War have been the subject of much controversy. After Fair Oaks, three dozen officers ranking from lieutenant through colonel petitioned Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, then commander of the Army of the Potomac, recommending Howard for divisional command. On the other hand, several Union generals were harshly critical of his performance during the war. Some modern authors have criticized Howard for allowing Stonewall Jackson to surprise him at Chancellorsville in 1863. But Howard was capable of learning from his mistakes. While several contemporaries and some modern scholars have faulted Howard for having been forced back to Cemetery Ridge on the first day of fighting at Gettysburg, calling his actions on 1 July totally inadequate, he clearly understood the tactical significance of the positions he held on the subsequent days of that battle. On 2 and 3 July, Howard and his men generally gave a good account of themselves on the battlefield. Carpenter also notes that Howard, more so than Sherman, was well prepared for a series of Confederate attacks which ultimately failed at Ezra Church, Georgia, in July 1864, during a critical phase of the battle of Atlanta. Confederate losses there were estimated to have exceeded 5,000 men, while Howard's casualties numbered about 600.

General Howard had a thankless task between 1865 and 1874 as the commissioner of the War Department's Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, commonly called the Freedmen's Bureau. Some modern authorities, notably William S. McFeely, have maintained that Howard's tenure in that post was not a success. McFeely argues in *Yankee*

Stepfather: General O. O. Howard and the Freedman (New Haven, 1968) that Howard should have vigorously opposed President Andrew Johnson's veto of the first Freedman's Bureau Bill in February 1866, even to the point of resigning in protest, if necessary. Many politicians would have backed him, says McFeely, as would Grant and Sherman, who, "despite irritation with his moralistic ways [never] wavered in their respect for their wartime lieutenant." In addition, McFeely suggests that Howard often placed the bureau's continued existence, and his own career as "Yankee stepfather," before the interests of the freedmen, because he considered the work of the bureau to be a "moral crusade."

While it is true that Howard thought the bureau could serve as a durable government advocate for black interests, these criticisms do not give adequate weight to the social, political, and fiscal realities with which Howard had to contend during the Reconstruction period. Northern radicals demanded more of the bureau than could have probably been achieved at the time. In addition, considerable emphasis must be given to the roles played by an unsympathetic President Andrew Johnson and the many antagonistic white Southern leaders, who did their best to subvert the reconstruction process in general and the bureau in particular. In this unpromising situation, Carpenter contends, Howard should be commended for striving hard to do what he thought best for the former slaves in his charge.

Some of Howard's contemporaries found his reputation for piety hard to stomach, but Carpenter points out that Howard himself "never believed that he deserved it." (p. 284) Carpenter observes that Howard "does not belong in that numerous body of nineteenth century American busybodies who believed it their special duty to look after the morals of the nation." (p. 285) Most of the bureau's responsibilities ended with the restoration of civil government across the South in 1868, but Carpenter does not give this point sufficient emphasis. He does, however, stress Howard's other initiatives, including his efforts to improve educational opportunities for blacks, notably by the establishment of Howard University, and discusses Howard's support for an African American bank, which ultimately failed during the Panic of 1873.

Originally published in 1964 by the University of Pittsburgh Press and now reissued with a new introduction, Carpenter's book remains the most balanced and thoughtful account of Howard's career and the only complete modern biography of this complex personality.

Keir B. Sterling is the command historian at the U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command, Fort Lee, Va. From 1983 to 1998, he was the Ordnance branch historian. His article "U.S. Army Contributions to American Natural Science" appeared in the Summer 1997 issue of Army History *(No. 42).*

Book Review
by Frank N. Schubert

Buffalo Soldiers and Officers of the Ninth Cavalry, 1867–1898: Black and White Together
by Charles L. Kenner
University of Oklahoma Press, 1999, $26.95

This book concerns the history of the Ninth Cavalry, one of the two black regular cavalry regiments in the Army, in the period between the Civil War and the War with Spain. These soldiers, now popularly known as "buffalo soldiers," served in the wars that resulted in the dispossession, pauperization, and confinement on reservations of the native tribes of the trans-Mississippi West. Over the past thirty years or so, the black regulars have evolved into larger-than-life Western heroes. Celebrations of their exploits frequently, and contradictorily, claim that they played a disproportionate role in the taming of the West and that they were uniquely sympathetic to the plight of their Indian enemies. Buffalo soldiers have become the subjects of songs, plays, movies, and novels, and their images adorn tee shirts, refrigerator magnets, historical art prints, and even a United States postage stamp.

Despite these many indications that buffalo soldiers have become widely familiar in the popular culture, Charles Kenner's book starts with the premise that "the lives and deeds" of buffalo soldiers and their officers "have largely been overlooked." (p. 3) Then in twenty-one chapters, his volume ranges over the careers of some of the white officers, all three black officers, and some of the black enlisted men of the regiment. Because so much of his documentation comes from court-martial records, he cautions that life in the Ninth Cavalry may not have been as turbulent as his narrative indicates, and he considers the Ninth to have been "an elite regiment." (p. 6)

For a number of reasons, I wanted to like this book. In the first place, the subject is of great interest to me. I have written a number of articles and three books about the black regulars in the period of the Indian wars. In addition, I value a biographical approach. My book *Black Valor: Buffalo Soldiers and the Medal of Honor, 1870–1898*, looked at the lives of those black soldiers who received recognition for their valor, although in a much more chronological framework than Kenner employed.

Kenner's kind of biographical approach, multiple parallel narratives that separately follow a number of lives through the same period, may have caused him to miss some significant connections. His chapter 2 "The Colonel of the Buffaloes," traces the career of Col. Edward Hatch from the Civil War to Hatch's death in a carriage accident in 1889 at Fort Robinson, Nebraska. Kenner considers Hatch to have been a good officer and commander, who has not received due recognition from historians.

Several other chapters in the book suggest that Hatch's command of the regiment, which lasted from the establishment of the Ninth until his death, was marred by gross lapses of discipline. Chapter 10 describes the violent conditions in F Troop at Fort Robinson during 1887 that led to the murder of 1st Sgt. Emanuel Stance, one of three homicides in the regiment in a year; chapter 14 discusses similar problems during the same year at Fort Duchesne, Utah; chapter 16 shows the poor state of discipline at Fort Sill, Indian Territory, in 1884; and chapter 18 illuminates the lack of discipline in the regiment at Fort Stanton, New Mexico, in 1881. The author may be right that Hatch in his later years had evolved into a "relaxed, at-ease-with-the-world soul," (p. 42) but he was the commander of a cavalry regiment and responsible for its good order and discipline. In my view, historians have been generous to Hatch by turning their attention to other colonels, such as Ranald Mackenzie, Benjamin Grierson, Wesley Merritt, and Eugene Carr. Certainly, the multiple instances of indiscipline, violence, and insubordination do not support Kenner's view that the Ninth was an elite regiment.

In fact, nothing in the book supports either that assertion or the claim that the story of these soldiers has been overlooked. As I have noted elsewhere, based on the research of Thomas D. Phillips and Thomas E. Dowling, black soldiers on the frontier received a reasonable amount of recognition in comparison to the number of Indian campaigns and engagements in which they participated.[1] Historians have certainly *not* ignored their story. Bruce Glasrud and William Leckie have collected 334 citations to books, articles, and graduate theses related to buffalo soldiers through 1997.[2] If anything, the black regulars now get more attention than the rest of the frontier army.

Buffalo Soldiers and Officers of the Ninth Cavalry is a useful and interesting book. Some of the chapters are engrossing, and all of them are rich in detail about the lives of many members of the regiment. Nevertheless, readers will have to be wary of the mistakes that the editors allowed to remain in the volume. These start on the first page of chapter one, where the post–Civil War Army is described as consisting of 45 infantry and 10 cavalry companies, rather than regiments, understating the size of the army by a factor of ten. The Christian Fleetwood collection at the Library of

New Army Airborne & Special Operations Museum Opens

A new $22.5 million U.S. Army Airborne & Special Operations Museum opened in downtown Fayetteville, North Carolina, on 16 August 2000. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry Shelton; museum foundation president, retired General James Lindsay; the Chief of Military History, Brig. Gen. John Brown; Congressman Robin Hayes; and former presidential candidate Ross Perot were among those who attended the museum's grand opening. Some 3,000 people visited the museum on its first day of operation. The new museum's chief curator, Army Reserve Maj. John Aarsen, is the former commander of the 101st Military History Detachment.

Congress has become the "Fletcher Christian" collection; Simpson Mann has become "Shelburne Mann"; and the picture on pages 48–49 has been reversed. In an endnote, Philip Bettens's name is spelled "Batteus." Because of such errors and Kenner's rhetorical excesses—"incredible solidarity" (p. 91); "incredibly exaggerated recollections" (p. 94); "incredibly, he refused" (p. 108); "incredible ineptness" (p. 127); "incredibly, Day refused" (p. 206); and "incredible leadership" (p. 225)—readers should use this book with care.

NOTES

1. Frank N. Schubert, *Black Valor: Buffalo Soldiers and the Medal of Honor, 1870–1898* (Wilmington, Del., 1997), pp. 164–65.
2. Bruce A. Glasrud and William H. Leckie, "Buffalo Soldiers," in Glasrud, comp., *African Americans in the West: A Bibliography of Secondary Sources* (Alpine, Tex., 1998), pp. 32–53.

Dr. Frank N. Schubert is chief of joint operational history in the Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. He is the author, among other titles, of Vanguard of Expansion: Army Engineers in the Trans-Mississippi West, 1819–1879 *(Washington, D.C., 1980), and* On the Trail of the Buffalo Soldier: Biographies of African Americans in the U.S. Army, 1866–1917 *(Wilmington, Del., 1995).*

Book Review
by Michael A. Boden

Bullies and Cowards
The West Point Hazing Scandal, 1898–1901
by Philip W. Leon
Greenwood Press, 2000, 193 pp., $55

Tradition at the United States Military Academy has deep roots that extend back to the institution's founding in 1802. While some traditions, such as the use of demerits and the Thayer system of disciplined academics, have endured through the years, others are more recent creations. The rites of passage that all cadets go through during their first (plebe) year, particularly their first summer of familiarization and training commonly known as "Beast Barracks," have a long history, although specific details of each class's experience have changed. Hazing seems to have always been a part of a cadet's experience, even though the manner and methodology of such activities has evolved. Philip Leon, a professor of American literature at The Citadel, addresses a very intriguing period in the development and moderation of cadet hazing at the U.S. Military Academy. Events surrounding the experience of one Fourth Class cadet at the turn of the twentieth century would have far-reaching implications and repercussions for cadet discipline and training at West Point.

The story seems rather mundane at first glance. In June of 1898, Oscar Booz, an intelligent and highly respected young man from Bristol Township, Pennsylvania, arrived at West Point to begin his career as a cadet. Unfortunately, Oscar would not be a particularly successful cadet, and he experienced problems with discipline during Beast Barracks. These problems continued into the academic year, and Oscar resigned from the academy in October. To this point, there was nothing truly remarkable about Oscar Booz's story. That would change in December 1900, however, when Booz died of tuberculosis, allegedly brought on by extreme hazing at West Point. Of particular note were two incidents: an arranged fistfight against an upperclassman and the forced consumption of hot sauce, which, critics alleged, left his oral cavity susceptible to microbial invasion. Sinister images of the Booz affair, played out in the national media and in congressional committee meetings, focused national attention on the practices of hazing and cadet development at West Point. The allegations concerning this hazing would haunt West Point through the first decades of the twentieth century.

Leon directs his analysis at the turmoil caused by the Booz scandal and its implications for the Military Academy. He evaluates these events on two levels, while providing a thought-provoking narrative to the reader. On one level, Leon examines the problem caused by contrasting, in a very public manner, the academy's lofty standards, best exemplified by the Cadet Honor Code, with the reprehensible forms of hazing evident in the cruel treatment of Booz. Leon emphasizes the fine line between the need for strong military discipline and the possible debasement of the high ideals of West Point, and he examines how the cases of hazing brought to light by the congressional investigation of the Booz affair crossed this line. At stake were not only the public ramifications of this dichotomy, but also the private implications within academy life of what true "manliness" really meant. Leon effectively uses the example of the severe hazing that Cadet Douglas MacArthur, a member of the class of 1903, one behind Booz, underwent during Beast Barracks in the summer of 1899 to elucidate these issues. These dilemmas are still relevant in the year 2000, as similar situations appear frequently in the news involving rites of passage and initiations not only in the military, but also in high school and college sporting teams, fraternities, and clubs.

A second level at which Leon effectively conveys the impact of the hazing debate involves the analysis of the subsequent problems within the Corps of Cadets that stemmed from the academy's response to the public controversy. Many of these matters involved specific actions taken by the academy's superintendent, Col. Albert L. Mills, and concerned questions regarding his authority. In April 1901 this disputation culminated in a miniature "mutiny" among the Cow (junior class) leaders of the Corps following a perceived injustice to a classmate, and this led to the dismissal or suspension of eleven cadets—over 10 percent of the class of 1902. Through this example, Leon illuminates a different element of the hazing specter, the manner in which the academy reacted to the problem and the effects this reaction had on the cadets.

Perhaps the only area in which Leon's account appears lacking is his attempt to evaluate the effects of yellow journalism and sensationalism. This discussion occurs in the middle third of the book, which consists primarily of a narration of congressional hearings and testimony. While this certainly is relevant and indeed necessary to the development of the book, Leon's presentation of this material is relatively dry and unexciting. Leon is much more effective in the early section of this book, where he provides a framework for the problems he will address, and in the last third, where he collects his findings and discusses the repercussions and effects of the hazing scandals on the Military Academy.

Leon's conclusion does not offer concrete solutions to hazing problems. His work is very valuable, however, because it presents a difficult historical situation that has great relevance to today's world, both civilian and military. The reader gains real insight into the problems and divisions that arise in a situation of intense mental pressure and demanding physical stress. There is no easy solution to any of the problems Leon demonstrates, and he should be commended for not trying to force any. These are difficult questions that merit serious dialogue, due to their significance in today's world. The story of Oscar Booz, and its presentation by Leon, provides an excellent historical window through which these issues may be examined in a thoughtful light.

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Book Review
by Wilbur R. Miller

The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1877–1945
by Clayton D. Laurie and Ronald H. Cole
U.S. Army Center of Military History
1997, 475 pp., $38

One of three volumes on the domestic police role of the United States Army, this official history is thoughtful and thoroughly researched. Clayton D. Laurie and Ronald H. Cole argue that until the 1870s the military dealt with domestic violence only when federal authority was directly challenged, as in the Whiskey Rebellion or southern resistance to Reconstruction. Burgeoning industrialization and class conflict after the Civil War led to a new duty for the army when local police and state militias could not contain labor conflicts or race riots. The only precedent for this role was the constitutional provision that the president could call in troops when state officials were unable or unwilling to do so.

Use of the army was a last resort, and public response was divided. Americans traditionally feared a large standing army that performed police functions. Workers and their supporters criticized the army as a tool of the industrial magnates, while the propertied classes regarded federal intervention as essential when local forces were inefficient or unreliable. Army officers were supposed to remain neutral, but some were obviously hostile to workers. Enlisted men, though mostly working class themselves, followed orders as if they were in combat. Combat was the usual military strategy and tactics in coping with demonstrators, strikers, and rioters that officers considered "public enemies."

Detailed accounts of strikes, race riots, or frontier conflicts among whites reveal that military conduct was sometimes restrained and other times unrestrained. Laurie and Cole argue that, during the Progressive Era, under presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, the army seemed to be moving toward a less combative attitude to civilians creating disorder.

Progress halted during World War I when the army joined government agencies at all levels and private civilian groups to destroy all varieties of radicalism and labor militancy. The secretary of war suspended the traditional procedure for requesting military aid in domestic violence, allowing state officials to call directly on local commanders for troops. The fruit of the war experience was "war plans white," contingency plans for military mobilization and action in case of a revolution. Although later versions were less shrill and more legalistic, various tactical manuals codified handling of demonstrators and strikers as combat. The last expression of these attitudes was Gen. Douglas MacArthur's harsh suppression of the Bonus March in 1932. During the New Deal the army did not in-

New Publications

The Center of Military History has issued a new title in its U.S. Army in Vietnam series, *Combat Operations: Stemming the Tide, May 1965 to October 1966*, by John M. Carland. This is the second book to be issued of the four Vietnam combat operations volumes projected by the Center, and it joins George MacGarrigle's *Combat Operations: Taking the Offensive, October 1966 to October 1967*, issued in 1998. Dr. Carland's book is CMH Pub 91–5. The cloth edition may be purchased from the Government Printing Office for $43 under stock number 008–029–00354–6.

The Center has also issued a new book by Edgar F. Raines, Jr., *Eyes of Artillery: The Origins of Modern U.S. Army Aviation in World War II*. This title is CMH Pub 70–31. The cloth edition may be purchased from the Government Printing Office for $39 under stock number 008–029–00356–2, and the paperback edition is available for $37 under GPO stock number 008–029–00363–5.

The Center has published *Soldiers Are Our Credentials: The Collected Works and Selected Papers of the Thirty-third Chief of Staff, United States Army*, by Dennis J. Reimer, edited by James Jay Carafano. This is CMH Pub 70–69. The paperback edition may be purchased from the Government Printing Office for $22 under stock number 008–029–00358–9.

The Center has issued *Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1994*, CMH Pub 101–25, which is available only to Army publication account holders. CMH has also issued a fourth Korean War commemorative historical poster map covering the fourth and fifth Korean War campaigns, the first UN counteroffensive and the CCF spring offensive campaigns, 25 January–8 July 1951. This poster map may be purchased from the Government Printing Office for $7.50 under stock number 008–029–00359–7. It is CMH Pub 19–4.

Each of these CMH publications is also available to Army publication account holders from the Army Publications Distribution Center–St. Louis.

The XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg History Office has issued a video CD entitled "Fort Bragg: A Century of Progress." Fort Bragg archivist Donna Tabor can provide information about obtaining a copy. She may be contacted by email at tabordb@bragg.army.mil, by phone at 910-396-8713, or by mail at the XVIII Airborne Corps, ATTN: AFZA-GT-H (Donna Tabor), Fort Bragg, NC 28310-5000.

tervene in strikes, which were left to state and local military and police forces. Plant seizures and the handling of the Detroit race riots during World War II revealed a cautious military attitude.

Laurie and Cole emphasize progress toward neutrality and conformity to legal procedures in military handling of domestic violence. The body of the book, however, reveals a less whiggish conclusion: that the army mirrored dominant political attitudes and changed its perceptions and tactics as those attitudes changed. This is a valuable study not only for military historians but also for students of national state development and labor historians.

Wilbur R. Miller is a professor of history at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. He is the author of Revenuers & Moonshiners: Enforcing Federal Liquor Law in the Mountain South, 1865–1900 *(Chapel Hill, 1991). This review appeared in the March 1999 issue of the* Journal of American History *and is reprinted with permission.*

Book Review
by Burton Wright III

Stalin's Spy
Richard Sorge and the Tokyo Espionage Ring
by Robert Whymant
St. Martin's Press, 1998, 368 pp., $25.95

There are few individuals in history of whom it can be said that they alone changed the course of a war. Richard Sorge is one of those few, but not many people have ever heard of him.

Robert Whymant has written a well-researched and smooth-flowing work on this forgotten spy and his impact on World War II. Sorge's work as a Soviet spy in Tokyo provided Moscow with some of the most important strategic intelligence of the war. This description of Sorge's career underscores in dramatic fashion the critical importance of safeguarding strategic intelligence.

The son of a German father and Russian mother, Sorge comes alive in very human terms in the pages of this book. The reader, however, should concentrate on what he was doing as a spy. By ingratiating himself with the German ambassador and making friends among the more influential Japanese, Sorge managed to provide his masters in Moscow with critical information at decisive points in the war.

The author, a journalist by profession, spent two decades tracking down people with direct knowledge of the Sorge ring and eventually managed to see transcripts of some of the messages sent by his radio operator, Max Clausen, that gave the Soviets direct information on two critical issues. The first was a warning that Germany was preparing to attack the Soviet Union. To this information Stalin paid no attention, and, when the German attack began in June 1941, the unprepared Soviet troops were easily overrun. Russia came close to losing the war. However, after his initial failure to listen to his own intelligence sources, Stalin began to pay a lot more attention to what they provided, including the information Sorge was sending from Tokyo.

The second piece of information was even more vital. Sorge learned, through his contact with the highly placed Hotsumi Ozaki, that a power struggle was under way within the Japanese Army. There were two groups, a strike-north faction and a strike-south faction. The former wanted to invade Siberia and support the German assault against Russia. The latter wanted to move south against the British in Malaya and the Americans in the Philippines and to seize the wealth of the Dutch East Indies. It was the victory of the latter faction that led directly to Pearl Harbor. Sorge's knowledge of the outcome of this struggle allowed him to tell Moscow that the Kwantung Army in Manchuria would not be attacking Siberia.

The Russians had kept a large army in the Far East to counter the threat of attack by the Japanese. With this threat effectively removed, Stalin was able to move much of that army to the western front, employ it in the battle for Moscow, and decisively throw back the German advance. By the time the reinforcements had arrived, German forward positions were at the last tram stop on the Moscow trolley line, and Wehrmacht leaders could see the spires of the Kremlin through their binoculars.

Throughout these critical months, Sorge kept up the pace needed to supply Stalin with all the information he wanted, albeit at great personal cost. The pressure of spying on the man was enormous, for Sorge had reason to believe that his days were numbered. He began to act more irrationally, drink more heavily, and engage in operations that any careful spy would have avoided. The Japanese security services eventually caught one of the lower members of his ring, and they worked their way to Sorge.

His arrest hit the German embassy in Tokyo like a thunderclap. Sorge was questioned for nearly three years, before being executed along with Ozaki near the end of 1944. His Soviet masters made no effort to rescue him from the gallows. Grateful or not, Stalin had gained much from Sorge's efforts. As this book clearly demonstrates, the bottom line is that strategic intelligence can win or lose a war. Guarding it must be a constant imperative for all. If you want to clearly understand that, read *Stalin's Spy*.

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Book Review
by Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

Albanian Escape: The True Story of U.S. Army Nurses behind Enemy Lines
by Agnes Jensen Mangerich, as told to Evelyn M. Monahan and Rosemary L. Neidel
University Press of Kentucky, 1999, 220 pp., $25

On 8 November 1943, a group of thirteen female U.S. Army flight nurses and twelve male medical noncommissioned officers boarded a C–53 airplane at Catania, Sicily, for a 260-mile flight to Bari, on Italy's Adriatic coast, to pick up wounded soldiers. During the flight, which had already been postponed twice due to severe winter weather, an unexpected storm blew the plane off course and it crash-landed in German-occupied Albania. During the following nine weeks, the group of stranded Americans was assisted and guided to safety by Albanian partisans, British Special Operations Executive (SOE) officers, and U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) personnel.

This book chronicles on an almost daily basis the activities of the American nurses and medical sergeants as they evaded the Germans, trekked mountain paths, and endured considerable hardships before being led to the Adriatic coast and rescued on 9 January 1944. The first four days of the group's ordeal in Albania are covered in the first quarter of the book. The second half of the narrative is interspersed with official military reports.

One of the American nurses in this group was 2d Lt. Agnes Jensen. During her nine weeks in Albania, Jensen "carefully kept a diary on three tiny pieces of paper, logging as best [she] could names of towns, weather and walking conditions, and descriptions of those who helped [them]." (p. ix) In subsequent years Jensen, who took the name Mangerich upon her marriage, expanded her recollections in an effort to "connect the snippets of information" (p. ix) she had told her children and friends over the passing decades. Jensen's draft was later given to Evelyn Monahan and Rosemary Neidel, who reworked the text and crafted it into the final manuscript.

This chronicle is based on Jensen's experiences, and, as one would expect, she emerges as the protagonist. Although referred to in the third person, she appears to be the most knowledgeable, competent, and decisive member of the group. Almost every page contains verbatim and sometimes lengthy quoted conversations—quite a feat of memory after the passage of a half-century, based on notes written on "three tiny pieces of paper." Even more remarkable is the author's ability to quote verbatim, without references, a conversation between William J. Donovan, director of the OSS, and an OSS operative, at which she had not been present. The book's final compilers attempt to explain this phenomenon: "Although the conversations quoted here cannot be said to be verbatim, they are as close as possible, given the documents available and Agnes Jensen Mangerich's excellent recall." (p. xii)

A very interesting aspect of this book is the perspective it provides of the concerns, strengths, and weaknesses of a group of American servicewomen exposed to challenging military circumstances. While it was not the fault of the Americans that they did not have sufficient clothing and equipment for an extended period, it does appear that their state of physical and emotional readiness was less than adequate for duty in a combat zone. In the book's concocted conversations, the female nurses express consternation at having only one change of clothes and no shampoo or sanitary napkins and their distress at not having finished addressing Christmas cards. After spending their first night in Albania in a stone house, the women were shocked that the "one-holer was without even the pretense of a toilet seat." (p. 31) After the first full day of marching, although purportedly hungry, Jensen—a nurse—was sickened at the sight of an ox being butchered for dinner. Jensen's thoughts, after slightly more than a day of walking, focused on a "lounge chair," since she was "thoroughly tired out"; (p. 43) the following day she was "exhausted" (p. 44) and two days later "bone-tired." (p. 49)

Amid repetitious accounts of eating rice and cornbread for almost every meal and other minutiae, one learns that the group on at least one occasion remained in the open shouting and jumping at the sight of U.S. planes flying overhead, although Germans were thought to be nearby. At another time, the group failed to take simple measures of personnel accountability, with a resultant break in contact. On many other occasions, Jensen's concerns with frivolous items seemed to mitigate the severity of the hardships endured.

Nonetheless, *Albanian Escape* is an interesting tale based upon the author's experiences as a member of a mixed-gender medical group stranded in German-occupied Albania during World War II. The discerning reader will find information of interest and value in the chronicle of these female and male soldiers enduring hardships, inclement weather, and enemy threats as they escaped to friendly lines.

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